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Abstract
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN COMMUNICATION GAMES
SIGNALING WITH AN AUDIENCE
by
Farishta Satari
Adviser: Professor Rohit Parikh
Communication is a goal-oriented activity where interlocutors use language
as a means to achieve an end while taking into account the goals and plans
of others. Game theory, being the scientific study of strategically interactive
decision-making, provides the mathematical tools for modeling language use
among rational decision makers. When we speak of language use, it is obvious
that questions arise about what someone knows and what someone believes.
Such a treatment of statements as moves in a language game has roots in the
philosophy of language and in economics. In the first, the idea is prominent
with the work of Strawson, later Wittgenstein, Austin, Grice, and Lewis. In
the second, the work of Crawford, Sobel, Rabin, and Farrell.
We supplement the traditional model of signaling games with the fol-
lowing innovations: We consider the effect of the relationship whether close or
distant among players. We consider the role that ethical considerations may
play in communication. And finally, in our most significant innovation, we
introduce an audience whose presence affects the sender’s signal and/or the
receiver’s response.
iv
In our model, we no longer assume that the entire structure of the game
is common knowledge as some of the priorities of the players and relationships
among some of them might not be known to the other players.
v
to Mom and Dad
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1 Introduction
The creation of symbolic systems was perhaps one of the greatest human in-
ventions. Natural languages, non-verbal languages such as written or sign lan-
guage, mathematical logic, or computer programming languages, they all serve
the purpose of creating a repository of information, using objects and events
to represent other objects and events forming discrete mental or machine rep-
resentations. Each of them allows us to represent the world to ourselves and
communicate it to others through language.
The formal inquiry of language and meaning is an interdisciplinary field
of study that lies at the intersection of psychology, philosophy of language, eco-
nomics, linguistics, and computer science. Psychology of language is concerned
with the psychological and neurobiological factors that enable humans to ac-
quire, use, comprehend, and produce language. In philosophy of language the
inquiry into language and the nature of meaning dates back as far as Aristo-
tle. What does it mean to mean something? What is the relationship between
language and reality? How are sentences composed into meaningful wholes
out of the meanings of parts? What is the social aspect of communication
between speakers and listeners? And so on. In Economics, researchers study
information flow in the market and how decisions are made in transactions by
means of information exchange. The dynamics of information asymmetry is
studied empirically and using theoretical models. Linguistics is the scientific
study of human language; form, meaning, and use.
In the linguistics of both natural and artificial languages, syntax, se-
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mantics and pragmatics categorize language characteristics. Syntax is the rules
or form of representation that governs the way words are combined to form
phrases, and phrases are combined to form sentences in a language, code,
or other forms of representation. Semantics is the meaning of such words,
phrases, sentences and how meaning attaches to larger chunks of text as a
result of the composition from smaller parts. Pragmatics bridges the explana-
tory gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning. It is the study of
the relationship between the symbols of a language, their meaning, and use
in a given context. In short, syntax is about form, semantics about meaning,
and pragmatics about meaning that arises from use.
In computer science, an application of mathematical logic, formal lan-
guages take the form of character strings, produced by a combination of syntax
grammar and semantics. A programming language is equipped with seman-
tics that can be utilized for building programs that perform specific tasks. In
computer languages syntax serves as the underlying grammatical structure of a
program and semantics reflects the meaning. For example, x += y in Java and
(incf x y) in Common Lisp are two statements with different syntax but issue
the same instruction i.e. arithmetical addition of y to x and storing the result
in variable x. The semantic function of a programming language is embedded
in the logic of a compiler or interpreter, which compiles or interprets the pro-
gram for execution based on a mathematical model that describes the possible
computations described by the language. An equivalent semantic function,
not necessarily with the same representation, can presumably be found in the
mind of the programmer. Mathematical models such as Backus Normal Form
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BNF and parse trees are used for syntactical representation of programs while
models such as Denotational, Operational, and Axiomatic semantics are used
to explain code semantics. The role of pragmatics becomes obvious in the
context of information exchange over the Internet and the Wolrd Wide Web.
The Internet is a decentralized global network of interconnected computers
using the standard protocol TCP/IP consisting of millions of business, gov-
ernment, private, academic, and other networks carrying information resources
and services through interlinked documents. With the advancements in the
last decades, we have made information available anywhere and anytime but
not necessarily the right information.
Better formal models of communication and information exchange that
capture game theoretic and social aspects of information transmission are a
crucial step towards the realization of robust multi-agent systems that better
understand and satisfy the needs of people and machines alike.
3
2 Philosophical Background
In the twentieth century, there have been two broad traditions in philosophy
of language, the ideal language and the ordinary language traditions.
Ideal language philosophy originated in the study of logic and mathe-
matics. Philosophers believed that for ordinary language to be unambiguous,
it must be reformulated using the resources of modern logic. The predominant
account in this tradition has been the view that the purpose of a sentence is
to state a proposition and thus is true or false based on the truth or falsity
of that proposition. In this view, sentences are treated as propositions ; the
semantic content of a sentence, which is either true or false depending on its
agreement with reality. Language is then about the world and it references
objects in the world.
Frege’s [55] puzzle of identity shows that treating meaning as reference
to objects runs into problems i.e. one cannot account for the meaning of
certain sentences simply on the basis of reference. Where an identity statement
like “the morning star is the morning star” is trivially true, there is much
to be said about a statement like “the morning star is the evening star.”
The first statement is true in virtue of language alone. However, the second
statement has cognitive value. To solve this, Frege suggested that the words or
expressions of a language have both a reference and a sense. Descriptions “the
morning star” and “the evening star” reference the same object (i.e. planet
Venus) but express different ways of conceiving it so they have different senses.
The sense of an expression accounts for its cognitive significance. When two
4
objects have the same sense, they reference the same object. Expressions with
different senses may reference the same object and we can’t determine whether
or not they do based on language alone. In other words, that “the morning
star is the evening star,” has to be an astronomical discovery.
Russell [123] developed the theory further but rejected Frege’s notion of
sense replacing it with the idea of a propositional function; an expression hav-
ing the form of a proposition but containing undefined variables that become
a proposition when variables are assigned values. He tried to analyze definite
descriptors of the form “The . . .” by distinguishing between logical and gram-
matical content of the sentence. Consider the statement, “The present King
of France is bald.” Is it true or false? Russell proposed that when we say, “The
present King of France is bald,” we are implicitly making three separate exis-
tential assertions. First, there is an x such that x is a present King of France
(∃x(Fx)). Second, for every x that is a present King of France and every y that
is a present King of France, x is the same as y (∀x(Fx→ ∀y(Fy → y = x))).
Third, for every x that is a present King of France, x is bald (∀x(Fx→ Bx)).
These three assertions together say that the present King of France is bald 1.
Kripke [81] held the view that proper names do not have a sense and
articulated his idea using the formal model of possible worlds. For example,
take the current president of the United States of America, Barack Obama.
When we say, “President of the United States in 2009,” first we must state that
the name “Barack Obama” is the name of a particular individual. Then we
1Also expressed as there is some x such that x is the present King of France, and if
anyone happens to be the present King of France, it is x, and x is bald ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy →
y = x) ∧Bx).
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must imagine the possible worlds besides reality e.g. where Barack Obama was
never born, did not go to Harvard, or chose a different career, etc. Then it is
easy to see that a description like “President of the United States in 2009” does
not necessarily describe Barack Obama, because it does not necessarily have
the same value in all possible worlds. It only contingently describes Barack
Obama. In comparison, he argues proper names like “Barack Obama” will
always describe the same things across all possible worlds. Kripke calls terms
that have the same reference across all possible worlds rigid designators. If
we have two designators a and b that are rigid within metaphysical necessity,
a = b → 2(a = b) it doesn’t follow that they are rigid in epistemic context,
a = b 6→ K(a = b). That is if a = b is true then it is necessarily true (true in
all possible worlds) but it doesn’t follow that we know that a = b.
Idealist philosophers have often argued that two speakers can say the
same thing by uttering different sentences, whether in the same or different
languages, as long as the logical content of sentences agrees. For example,
when a German speaker utters the sentence “Schnee ist weiss” and an English
speaker utters the sentence “Snow is white,” they have said the same thing.
These two statements have different representation but both state a true fact
about snow being white. Davidson proposed that we can give a finite theory
of meaning for natural languages using Tarski’s approach, the correctness test
would be that it generates all the sentences of the form, “P” is true if and only
if P. For example, because “snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white,
the meaning of “snow is white” is snow is white. However, it is a much more
difficult problem. Formal logic is more precise and decisive but constructing
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an ideal language using formal devices whose sentences are clear, determinate
in truth-value, and free from metaphysical implications is impossible. Even if
such a precise language was realized, it is not guaranteed to be fully intelligible.
Ordinary language philosophy attempts at determining meaning in
terms of language use; Strawson, Wittgenstein, Austin, and Grice were among
the first contributors.
Strawson criticized Russell’s characterization of statements where the
referenced object doesn’t exist as being false. He held the view that a state-
ment like “The present King of France is bald,” is neither true nor false but
absurd. He argued that, if someone said, “The present King of France is bald,”
we would not say his statement is true or false since that question would not
arise as there is no King of France2. We may think he is under miscompre-
hension but the statement will not have a truth-value. Strawson believed that
use determines the meaning of a sentence.
In his latter work, Wittgenstein introduced the idea of language games
drawing an analogy between language and playing a game and how both activ-
ities are rule governed, “We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in
a field by playing with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing
many without finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into
the air, chasing one another with the ball and bombarding one another for a
joke and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a
ball game and following definite rules at every throw” [156]. We use language
following some rules but those rules don’t need to be the same rules every-
2France is presently a republic and has no king.
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where. We take part in a number of language games and confusion arises
when a statement in one language game is interpreted according to the rules
of another.
Austin [13] was the first who gave an account of sentence meaning in
terms of speakers’ actions. He argued that truth-evaluable sentences form
only a small part of the range of all sentences and that there are other types
of sentences, which perform actions or make the hearer take some action. By
saying, “I take this man as my lawfully wedded husband,” in the course of a
marriage ceremony, the speaker is indulging in the act of marriage.
Grice [63] points out that the alleged divergence between formal logical
devices such as ∧,∨,∀x,∃x,¬, and their analogues in natural language arises
due to use. He defines the Cooperative Principle and derives his celebrated
theory of implicatures drawing clear distinction between sentence meaning and
speaker meaning.
The ideal language philosophers have attempted to focus on reference
or what language could be about, whereas, the ordinary language philosophers
have tried to understand use or the communicative function of language. The
later is of importance to the development of communication games as it deals
with how information flows between individuals in a communication setting.
Since the focus is on language use and speaker meaning, it is evident that
questions arise about what someone knows and since knowledge presumes be-
liefs, how do we know what someone believes? Parikh [97] argues that such
questions have been addressed by Ramsey, de Finetti, and Savage in the con-
text of decision theory and the foundations of subjective probability. That is
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beliefs are revealed by the choices we make, the bets we accept and the bets
we refuse and among these choices are the choices of what to say and what to
assent to. This view of statements as moves in a game gives us the flexibility
to focus on the dynamics of information exchange, which will be explored in
this thesis.
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3 Meaning and Truth
Truth-conditional semantics for natural languages explain the meaning of as-
sertions as being the same as, or reducible to, their truth conditions. Davidson
[34] attempted at defining a semantic theory for natural languages along the
same lines as Tarski’s semantic theory of truth for formal languages. To un-
derstand Davidson’s theory, let us first look at Traski’s theory.
What is truth? As philosophical investigations reveal, this is not a
trivial question. There are many theories of truth, among them is the corre-
spondence theory of truth which suggests that the truth of a sentence depends
on how it relates to reality. The sentence giving the truth condition of a sen-
tence is called a T-sentence. A T-sentence takes the form; “P” is true in
language L if and only if P, where the quoted sentence “P” is the name of a
sentence in a language L and the unquoted sentence P is the translation.
T-sentences can be problematic as they can produce what is called a
Liar Paradox. A liar paradox is a self-referential statement of the form “This
sentence is false” and one arrives at a contradiction by reasoning about it.
That is trying to assign a truth-value to this statement leads to a contradic-
tion. If “This sentence is false” is true, then it is false, which would in turn
mean that it is actually true, but this would mean that it is false, and so on.
Similarly, if “This sentence is false” is false, then it is true, which would in
turn mean that it is actually false, but this would mean that it is true, and so
on.
Tarski addresses the issue of semantic incoherence in his famous un-
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definability theorem. Informally, Tarski’s undefinability theorem states that
for any sufficiently strong formal system, the truth predicate of such a system
cannot be defined within the system. He argued that in order to generate lin-
guistic theories free of paradoxes, it is important to distinguish the language
that one is talking about object language from the language that one is using
metalanguage. Tarski demanded that a theory of truth must have, for every
sentence P of a language L, a T-sentence of the form “P” is true if and only
if P.
For a language L containing connectives ¬, ∧, ∨ and quantifiers ∀ and ∃:
1. Negation ¬P is true if and only if P is not true
2. Conjunction P∧Q is true if and only if P is true and Q is true
3. Disjunction P∨Q is true if and only if P or Q is true, or both are true
4. Universal statement ∀xP (x) is true if and only if each object x satisfies
“P(x)”
5. Existential statement ∃xP (x) is true if and only if there is an object x
which satisfies “P(x)”
Consequently, the truth condition of complex sentences are built up on
these connectives and quantifiers and can be reduced to the truth con-
ditions of their constituents. The simplest constituents are atomic sen-
tences and the truth for an atomic sentence is defined as:
6. Atomic sentence F(x1, . . .,xn) is true relative to assignment of values
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to variables x1, . . .,xn if the corresponding values of variables bear the
relation expressed by predicate F.
Davidson proposed that we can give a finite theory of meaning for
natural languages using Tarski’s approach. To verify correctness we would
test if it generates all the sentences of the form “P” is true if and only if P.
For example, because “snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white, the
meaning of “snow is white” is snow is white. Davidson’s theory was harshly
criticized by some philosophers namely Soames and Dummett. Soames [136]
criticized truth-conditional semantics arguing that it is wrong and circular.
Truth-conditional semantics gives every necessary truth precisely the same
meaning as all of them are true under the same conditions. In other words,
the bi-conditional “if and only if ” ensures only that the left sentence will have
the same truth value as the right sentence, therefore allows us to make any
substitution of sentences on the right as long as its truth value is identical to
the sentence on the left. For example, if “snow is white” is true if and only if
snow is white, then it is the case that “snow is white” is true if and only if snow
is white and grass is green, therefore under truth-conditional semantics “snow
is white” means both that snow is white and that grass is green. Soames also
argues that in specifying which of the infinite number of truth-conditions for
a sentence will count towards its meaning, one must take the meaning of the
sentence as a guide. However, the theory is to specify meaning with truth-
conditions, and now it specifies truth-conditions with meaning, therefore it a
circular argument. Dummett [44] objected to Davidson’s theory on the basis
that such a theory of meaning will not explain what it is a speaker has to know
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in order for them to understand a sentence. The theory doesn’t account for the
learning process. Davidson realized the difficulty that natural languages are
rich and include a variety of sentences such as indirect speech such as “Galileo
said that the earth moves,” adverbial expressions such as “John walked slowly”
where “slowly” modifies “John walked,” and non-indicative sentences such as
imperatives such as “Eat your food.” He further developed the Principle of
Charity, originally introduced by Quine, which assumes that participants of
a talk exchange are rational in the sense that they promote agreement which
allows them to better understand words and thoughts of other people. In other
words, in order to converse with someone you have to attribute to him or her
mostly true beliefs.
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4 Words as Actions
In his most influential work [13], Austin argues that there are sentences in the
English language that are not statements of facts and thus neither true nor
false.
I take this woman to be my lawfully wedded wife.
I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.
I give and bequeath my watch to my brother.
I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
To utter one of these under the appropriate circumstances is not to
describe what one is doing but rather doing the act itself. To utter, “I take
this woman to be my lawfully wedded wife,” before the registrar or alter, you
are not reporting on a marriage but rather indulging in it. Similarly, the other
three sentences are not used to describe what one is doing, but used to actually
do an action such as naming, giving, or entering a contract. In these typical
cases, the action that the sentence describes is performed by the utterance of
the sentence itself. Austin calls these types of sentences performative sentences
or in short performatives. He argues that when something goes wrong in
connection with a performative utterance then the utterance is infelicitous or
unhappy rather than being true or false.
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4.1 Speech Act
Austin distinguishes between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary
acts.
A locutionary act describes the linguistic function of an utterance i.e.
the actual utterance and its ostensible meaning, comprising phonetic, and
phatic acts corresponding to the verbal, syntactic and semantic aspects of any
meaningful utterance.
An illocutionary act is the semantic of the utterance. The action, which
a performative sentence performs when uttered, belongs to an illocutionary act.
An illocutionary act is an act (1) for the performance of which the speaker must
make it clear to the hearer that the act is performed, and (2) the performance of
which involves the production of what Austin calls conventional consequences3
such as rights, commitments, or obligations.
A perlocutionary act is the actual effect a sentence has whether in-
tended or not. It can be thought as an effect of the illocutionary act. It is
viewed at the level of its psychological consequences on the hearer or reader,
such as persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or getting
someone to do or realize something.
Ann to Bob: “Do not go out without an umbrella.”
The utterance itself is a locutionary act with distinct phonetic, syntac-
tic and semantic features. It counts as an illocutionary act of Ann warning
3The idea of conventions is further developed by David Lewis and described here under
section ’Conventions’.
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Bob about the weather, and if Bob indeed takes an umbrella then Ann has
succeeded in persuading Bob and thus a perlocutionary act.
Bob to Ann: “I have a Porsche; would you like a ride sometime?”
The sentence has an illocutionary act of Bob offering Ann a ride and a
perlocutionary act of Bob showing off or impressing Ann.
These different types of acts, in particular illocutionary act, is now
widely known as speech acts. Austin’s work was further developed by Searle
[131] who classified illocutionary speech acts into different categories such as
assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations.
Assertives are speech acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the
expressed proposition. Directives are speech acts that cause the hearer to
take a particular action e.g. requests or commands. Commissives are speech
acts that commit a speaker to some future action e.g. promises. Expressives
are speech acts that express the speaker’s attitudes and emotions towards the
proposition e.g. congratulating or thanking someone. Declarations are speech
acts that change the reality in accord with the proposition of the declaration
e.g. pronouncing someone guilty of a crime.
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5 Intention-based Theory of Meaning
Grice’s [63] work greatly influenced the way philosophers, linguists, and cogni-
tive scientists think about meaning and communication. His work is a founda-
tion of the modern study of pragmatics drawing clear distinction between
speaker meaning, linguistic meaning, and the interrelations between these
two phenomena. He examined how in an ordinary conversational situation
a speaker S shapes his/her utterances to be understood by a hearer H and
how both S and H observe some central principles during the talk exchange.
His theory of meaning is one that is intention-based defining linguistic meaning
in terms of speaker meaning, “S meant something by U” is roughly equivalent
to “S uttered U with the intention of inducing a belief in H by means of the
recognition of his intention.” Grice used Searle’s example to make a distinction
between linguistic and speaker meaning.
An American soldier in the Second World War is captured by
Italian troops. In order to get the Italian troops to release him
he intends to tell them in Italian or German that he is a German
soldier. He doesn’t know Italian but says the only German line that
he knows, “Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen” which
in German means “Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees
bloom.” However, the Italian troops who do not know this meaning
but can figure out the soldier is speaking in German, may reason as
follows. “The soldier just spoke in German. He must intend to tell
us that he is a German soldier. Why would he speak in German
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otherwise? It could very well be that he is saying I am a German
soldier.”
Utterances can be divided into Indicative and Imperative. The first
type of utterances are those that make the hearer believe something. The
second type of utterances are those that try to make the hearer do something.
Furthermore, Grice emphasized that not only should the hearer believe/do
something by hearing the utterance but also recognize the speaker’s intentions.
An utterance could be any type of sound, mark, gesture, grunt, groan, etc.
In other words, an utterance is anything that can signal the intention of the
speaker.
5.1 Natural vs. Non-natural meaning
Grice understood meaning to refer to two rather different kinds of phenomena.
Natural meaning is supposed to capture something similar to the relation
between cause and effect as, for example, applied in the sentence “Those spots
mean measles.” This must be distinguished from what Grice calls non-natural
meaning as in, “Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus
is full.”
5.2 Cooperative Principle and its Maxims
At the heart of Grice’s theory of meaning lie the Cooperative Principle and
its special maxims of conversation. Cooperative Principle is a set of norms
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expected in a conversation. It mainly consists of four maxims. The Quantity
maxim requires that a speaker is as informative as required. It relates to the
quantity of information to be provided. The Quality maxim requires a speaker
to tell the truth provable by adequate evidence. The Manner maxim requires
the speaker to avoid ambiguity or obscurity, be direct and straightforward.
Finally the Relation maxim requires a speaker’s response to be relevant to
topic of discussion.
The Quantity maxim has two sub-maxims. First the speaker is to
make its contribution as informative as is required for the current purpose of
the exchange and second, the speaker is not to make its contribution more
informative than is required as it will bring confusion, raise side issues, and
may mislead the hearer to think there is some particular reason or point in
the provision of the excess of information. The Quality maxim also have two
sub-maxims, namely speaker is not to say what they believe to be false and
not say that for which they lack adequate evidence. The Manner maxim has
various sub-maxims such as speaker is to avoid obscurity of expression, avoid
ambiguity, be brief, and be orderly. The Relation maxim is to be relevant.
Grice doesn’t go into the possibility of questions that arise from this maxim.
Questions such as what might be the different kinds of relevance or the shift of
relevance during the talk exchange. He acknowledges the existence of all sorts
of other maxims aesthetic, social, or moral in character such as being polite
that may be observed by participants during talk exchanges.
A good question to ask is, why do people observe the Cooperative Principle?
Grice assumed that people have learned to do so in childhood. Lewis explains
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this in terms of social conventions. Both emphasize that the participants
interest must be aligned with a common goal and the existence of some sort
of mutual understanding in a talk exchange.
5.3 Conversational Implicature
Grice’s Cooperative Principle and its maxims are rational along the follow-
ing lines. Any one who cares about the central goal of a conversation given
suitable circumstances must have an interest in participating in that talk ex-
change. Any kind of exploitation of these maxims gives rise to a conversational
Implicature. A conversational Implicature falls under non-conventional Impli-
catures where the meaning of the utterance is not part of the conventional
meaning of the words.
Bob: I’m low on gas.
Ann: There is a station around the corner on Main St.
Here Ann’s utterance does not logically imply that the gas station is open.
However, if both Ann and Bob are obeying the Cooperative Principle, Ann’s
remark is irrelevant unless the station is open. Therefore, Bob can infer from
Manner and Quality maxims that Ann believes she has the evidence for the
gas station being open.
A speaker S by utterring P has implicated Q, if
1. S is presumed to be observing the maxims under Cooperative Principle
2. S supposed that (s)he is aware that Q is required in order to make his/her
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saying P consistent with this presumption
3. S thinks that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out or
grasp that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required
A hearer H can work out the Implicature by relying on the
4. Conventional meaning of the words used together with the identity of
any references that may be involved
5. Cooperative Principle and its maxims
6. Context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance
7. Items of background knowledge
8. Fact that all the facts falling under (4), (5), (6), and (7) are available to
both parties
It is worth mentioning that participants in a talk exchange may fail to
fulfill the above requirements in various ways such as mislead (quietly violating
a maxim in various ways), unwillingness to cooperate (opt out from the Coop-
erative Principle and its maxims or indicate the unwillingness to cooperate),
be faced with a clash (unable to fulfill one maxim without violating another),
or flout a maxim (fail to fulfill it).
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6 Conventions
Hobbes [67] claims that the lives of individuals in the state of nature were
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short, a state where self-interest and the
absence of rights and contracts prevented the social or society to form. The
society was in an anarchic state lacking leadership and its individuals apolitical
and asocial. This state of nature was followed by the social contract where
individuals came together and ceded some of their individual rights so that
others would cede theirs. For example, I give up my right to kill you if you do
the same. This resulted in the establishment of society, and by extension, the
state, and a sovereign entity to protect these new rights, which were now to
regulate social interactions.
Lewis [83] defines conventions as a set of generally accepted social
norms, which are enforced if they sustain and become laws. For example,
in some states, driving on the right side of the road, which may have started
as convention to avoid collision, has now become a law. But a social norm
doesn’t need be a law in order to be a convention. Convention is described
as a self-perpetuating solution to a recurring co-ordination problem i.e. no
one has reason to deviate from it given that others conform. For example,
if everyone drives on the right, you have reason to do so too, otherwise you
will cause a collision. A convention for the same problem may exist under
different form such as Europeans (at least in some countries) drive on the left
side and Americans on the right side of the road. A salient solution must rely
on what Lewis calls precedence. If both participants know that a particular
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co-ordination problem has been solved in the same manner before by others,
both know that both know this, both know that both know that both know
this, etc. the solution is common knowledge, then they will easily solve the
problem. Other people will in turn notice this and eventually the convention
becomes widespread. Lewis formalizes this phenomenon as follows.
6.1 Formal Definition
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are
agents in a recurrent situation S is a Convention if and only if it is true that,
and it is common knowledge in P that, in any instance S among members of
P:
1. Everyone conforms to R
2. Everyone expects everyone else to conform to R
3. Everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible
combinations of actions
4. Everyone prefers that everyone conform to R, on condition that at least
all but one conform to R
5. Everyone would prefer that everyone conform to R′, on condition that
at least all but one conform to R′
Where R′ is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of P in S,
such that no one in any instance of S among members of P could conform to
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both R′ and to R.
Lewis analyzing the nature of social conventions in game theoretic con-
text and argues that social conventions such as the driving example, are solu-
tions to co-ordination problems. Since participants’ interests are fully aligned
and the problem is finding a solution, there is no wrong solution so long as all
participants pick the same solution. The difficulty lies with finding a salient
solution since there may be several solutions to the problem.
6.2 Schelling’s Focal Point
Schelling’s [129] concept of focal points is one way to narrow down possible
solutions for a coordination problem. Schelling illustrates this with a puzzle
asking his students to answer the following questions. If you had to meet a
stranger in NYC, where and when do you meet them? This is a co-ordination
game, where any time in the day and place in the city could be an equilibrium
solution. Schelling found that the most common answer was, noon at Grand
Central Station. Note that there is no payoff related to this selection. Another
place in the city, perhaps a public library, could hold the same payoff so long as
enough people selected it as the meeting place. But, Grand Central Station’s
tradition as being a meeting place at the time raised its salience and made it
a focal point.
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6.3 Convention and Communication
The idea of linguistic conventions dates back to Plato [107] but David Lewis
was the first to provide a systematic theory of how social conventions gen-
erate linguistic meaning. Consider the following example, the sexton of the
Old North Church and Paul Revere (communicator and his audience) must
coordinate to warn the countryside of an assault by the British army.
The sexton acts according to some contingency plan, such as:
R1:
If the redcoats are observed staying home, hang no lantern in the belfry.
If the redcoats are observed setting out by land, hang one lantern in the belfry.
If the redcoats are observed setting out by sea, hang two lanterns in the belfry.
or
R2:
If the redcoats are observed staying home, hang one lantern in the belfry.
If the redcoats are observed setting out by land, hang two lanterns in the belfry.
If the redcoats are observed setting out by sea, hang no lanterns in the belfry.
or
R3: If the redcoats are observed staying home, hang one lantern in the belfry.
If the redcoats are observed setting out by land, hang no lantern in the belfry.
If the redcoats are observed setting out by sea, hang two lanterns in the belfry.
There are three more contingency plans with no lantern, one lantern, and two
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lanterns, plus any number of further plans involving other actions for example
hanging three lanterns, hanging colored lanterns, waving lanterns, hanging a
flag, and so on.
Paul Revere acts according to a contingency plan, such as:
C1:
If no lantern is observed hanging in the belfry, go home.
If one lantern is observed hanging in the belfry, warn the countryside that the
redcoats are coming by land.
If two lanterns are observed hanging in the belfry, warn the countryside that
the redcoats are coming by sea.
or
C2:
If no lantern is observed hanging in the belfry, warn the countryside that the
redcoats are coming by sea.
If one lantern is observed hanging in the belfry, go home.
If two lanterns is observed hanging in the belfry, warn the countryside that the
redcoats are coming by land.
or
C3:
If no lantern is observed hanging in the belfry, warn the countryside that the
redcoats are coming by land.
If one lantern is observed hanging in the belfry, go home.
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If two lanterns is observed hanging in the belfry, warn the countryside that the
redcoats are coming by sea.
It does not matter what contingency plan is followed so long as the
communicator and his audience coordinate on their plans. That is Paul Revere
warns the countryside that the redcoats are coming by land if and only if the
sexton observes them setting out by land, and that Paul Revere warns the
countryside that the redcoats are coming by sea if and only if the sexton
observes them setting out by sea. The coordination game for this example is
given below.
Paul Revere
C1 C2 C3 . . .
R1 1, 1 0, 0 .5, .5
Sexton R2 0, 0 1, 1 .5, .5
R3 .5, .5 .5, .5 1, 1
...
. . .
Successful communication is achieved when the sexton and Paul Revere
agree on one of the coordination equilibria that occurs along the diagonal, (R1,
C1), (R2, C2), (R3, C3), . . . and Paul Revere gives the right warning to the
countryside.
6.4 Formal Definition of Signaling
Lewis formally defines two-sided signaling (as in the example of Paul Revere
and the sexton) in which coordination is needed between a communicator and
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his audience.
A two-sided signaling problem is a situation S involving an agent called
the communicator and one or more agents called the audience, such that, and
it is common knowledge for the communicator and the audience that: Exactly
one of several alternative states of affairs s1, . . ., sm holds. The communicator,
but not the audience, is in a good position to tell which one it is. Each member
of the audience can do any one of several alternative actions r1, . . ., rm called
responses. Everyone involved wants the audience’s response to depend in
a certain way upon the state of affairs that holds. There is a certain one-
to-one function F from {si} onto {ri} such that everyone prefers that each
member of the audience do F (si) on condition that si holds, for each si. The
communicator can do any one of several alternative actions σ1, . . ., σn (n > m)
called signals. The audience is in a good position to tell which one he does. No
one involved has any preference regarding these actions which is strong enough
to outweigh his preference for the dependence F of audience’s responses upon
states of affairs. Preferred response is the same for all members of the audience.
In Lewis’s example, the sexton knows whether the redcoats are staying
home, coming by land, or coming by sea. By placing either zero, one, or two
lanterns in the belfry, he signals Paul Revere whether to go home, warn people
that redcoats are coming by land, or warn people that the redcoats are coming
by sea. A signaling problem in this sense is a coordination problem, because
communicator and his audience must coordinate so that the communicator’s
signal result in the mutually desired action.
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6.5 Meaning and Convention
Lewis argues that the use of language in a population consists of conventions
of truthfulness and trust among members of the population. Given that this
convention prevails, speakers who want to communicate have reason to con-
form to it, which in turn preserve the convention. He proposes that, a language
L is used by a population G if and only if there prevails in G a convention of
truthfulness and trust in L, sustained by an interest in communication, where
a speaker is truthful in L if and only if she tries to avoid uttering sentences
not true in L, and a speaker is trusting in L if and only if she believes that
sentences uttered by other speakers are true in L. In many respects, Lewis’s
account of language and convention descends from Grice’s theory of speaker
meaning.
Austin’s work explained that speech is not merely descriptive but can
serve as an action that implies further action of some kind. He was perhaps
one of the first to make this distinction. Lewis emphasized the existence of
social conventions at the heart of which lie language and co-operative problem
solving. Schelling’s focal points gave an account of finding the salient solution
among several solutions to a coordination problem. But in many cases we must
rely on what Lewis calls precedent in order to get a salient solution. If both
participants know that a particular co-ordination problem has been solved in
the same way numerous times before, both know that both know this, both
know that both know that both know this, etc. If it is common knowledge
between them then they will easily solve the problem. Even more people will
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see that they have solved the problem successfully, and thus the convention will
spread in society. A convention exists because it serves the interests of people
in a society. Needless to say a similar convention may exist that is entirely
different. For example, it is more or less arbitrary that one drives on the right
in the USA and left in some European countries. Lewis argued that in some
sense language is ruled by conventions. Grice presupposed this phenomenon
that if the participants in a talk exchange care about the central goal of a
conversation, they will obey the Cooperative Principle and its maxims.
This literature is critical to the development of communication models
using game theory. Both Lewis and Grice assumed that the participants’ in-
terests must be fully aligned in communication; thus limiting the discussion
to coordination games. Of course, the case where participants’ interests are
not aligned is of less interest as no communication can take place. The more
interesting case is where participants have partially aligned interests in a com-
munication game. There has been some work done by economists and game
theorists in this area, which we’ll discuss after a formal overview of decision
theory and game theory.
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7 Decision and Game Theory
We play a game together with other people whenever we have to decide among
several actions such that the decision depends on the choice of actions by
others and on our preferences over the ultimate result.
7.1 Decision Theory
A pure decision problem is one where the outcome of an action solely de-
pends on the state of the world and not on the actions of other players. A
player chooses among several actions based on the state of the world and his
preferences over expected outcomes. Preference means if a player can choose
between actions a1 and a2, and prefer the outcome s1 of a1 over s2 of a2, then
he prefers a1 over a2 and will choose a1.
Suppose Ann would like to buy a pair of shoes and a purse. She prefers
a pair of shoes and a purse over a pair of shoes only and a pair of shoes over
nothing. Ann’s preferences can be ranked as,
pair of shoes and a purse Ann pair of shoes Ann nothing
Another way to represent this ranking is by assigning numbers to the
outcomes of Ann’s choices (Table 1) called utilities. It has been shown mathe-
matically that cardinal utility is invariant up to a certain positive affine trans-
formation; utilities are arbitrary as long as they respect the preference order-
ings that they intended to represent.
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Ann’s Preferences
Choice Utility
Pair of shoes and a purse 2
Pair of shoes 1
Nothing 0
Table 1
If Ann’s budget is such that she can purchase a pair of shoes and a purse
then she will go with her first preference otherwise her second preference which
is just a pair of shoes.
Decision theory is mainly divided into three branches; decision under
certainty, decision under risk, and decision under uncertainty. Decision under
certainty is the decision situation where a decision maker knows the outcome
for each one of his actions. If each action leads to a set of possible outcomes
where each outcome occurs with a certain probability and the decision maker
knows these probabilities, then the decision situation is referred to as decision
under risk. Decision under uncertainty is the situation where no probabilities
for the outcomes are known to the decision maker, and further, no reasonable
assumptions can be made about such probabilities.
7.2 Game Theory
What distinguishes game theory from decision theory is the fact that in game
theory decisions have to be made with respect to the decisions of other players.
Game theory has a prescriptive and a descriptive aspect. It can tell us how we
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should behave in a game in order to produce optimal results or it can be seen
as a theory that describes how players actually behave in a game. A game is a
well-defined mathematical object consisting of a set of players, a set of moves
or strategies available to those players, and a specification of payoffs for each
combination of strategies.
Suppose Ann and Bob have to decide where to go out for the evening.
Bob would like to go to a football match while Ann would like to go to a
movie. Both would rather spend the evening together than apart.
Movie Ann Football Ann Alone
Football Bob Movie Bob Alone
Ann and Bob’s utilities are shown in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.
Ann’s Preferences
Choice Utility
Movie 2
Football 1
Alone 0
Table 2
Bob’s Preferences
Choice Utility
Football 2
Movie 1
Alone 0
Table 3
There are two common representations of games in the literature; the
normal form and the extensive form representations.
The normal or strategic form game is usually represented by a matrix
which shows the players, strategies, and payoffs. More generally it can be
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represented by any function that associates a payoff for each player with every
possible combination of actions. In each cell of the matrix, the first number
represents the payoff to the row player, and the second number represents the
payoff to the column player.
Ann
Bob
M F
M 2,1 0, 0
F 0, 0 1,2
Figure 1: Strategic representation of battle of the sexes game where Ann and Bob
choose between movie (M) or football (F).
The battle of the sexes game (Figure 1) has two equilibria. The equi-
libria set correspond to the choice of going to a movie together (M, M) or
going to a football match together (F, F). If Ann and Bob decide to go to a
movie then Ann’s receives a payoff of 2 and Bob a payoff of 1. If they decide
to go to a football match then Ann receives a payoff of 1 and Bob a payoff of
2. In addition to the two pure strategy equilibria, the game has a third mixed
strategy equilibrium where Ann and Bob go to their preferred event more often
than the other. In this equilibrium, Ann chooses movie with probability 2/3
and football with probability 1/3 and Bob chooses football with probability
2/3 and movie with probability 1/34.
The payoff matrix facilitates elimination of dominated strategies and is
often used for his purpose. For example, in the prisoner’s dilemma game (Fig-
ure 2), one can see that cooperate is strictly dominated by defect. Comparing
4The equilibrium is derived as follows. Let p be the probability Ann assigns to Football
at equilibrium. Since the two pure strategies of Bob must yield equal expected payoffs, 2p
+ 0(1−p) = 0p + (1−p) which implies p = 1/3. The other calculation is symmetric.
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the first numbers in each column (3  2 and 1  0) shows that no matter what
Carl chooses, Bob can do better by choosing defect. Similarly, comparing the
second payoff in each row (3  2 and 1  0) shows that no matter what Bob
chooses, Carl can do better by choosing defect. Thus, the unique Nash equi-
librium of the game is (D, D) where both Bob and Carl choose defect and
receive a payoff of 1 each. However, Bob and Carl can receive a better payoff
if they both cooperate.
Bob
Carl
C D
C 2, 2 0, 3
D 3, 0 1,1
Figure 2: Strategic representation of prisoners dilemma game where Bob and Carl
choose between cooperate (C) and defect (D).
When a game is presented in normal form, it is presumed that the
players act simultaneously or, at least, without knowing the actions of the
other. If players have some information about the choices of other players, the
game is usually presented in an extensive form.
A tree structure is used for graphical representations of games in the
extensive form. This form is useful for the representation of dynamic games;
games where there may occur whole sequences of moves by different players
with some order such as in a chess game. In a tree, each vertex or node
represents a point of choice for a player. The player is specified by a letter
listed by the vertex. The lines out of the vertex represent a possible action for
the player. The payoffs are specified at the bottom of the tree.
Figure 3 shows a game of perfect information. A, B, M , F stand for
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Figure 3: Extensive representation of battle of the sexes game with perfect infor-
mation.
Ann, Bob, movie, and football respectively. A moves first and chooses either
M or F . B sees A’s move and then chooses M or B. Suppose that A chooses
F and then B chooses F , then A gets 1 and B gets 2. Bob knows Ann’s choice
prior to making a move.
The extensive form can also capture simultaneous-move games of im-
perfect information. A dotted line is drawn along two different vertices to
represent them as being part of the same information set where Bob does not
know which point he is at (Figure 4).
However, both are games of complete information because there is no
uncertainty for the players about which game is being played i.e. there is a
single initial vertex. In games of incomplete information there are two or more
initial vertices and perhaps an initial move by nature. An oval around vertices
indicate they are part of the information set of a player in an incomplete game.
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Figure 4: Extensive representation of battle of the sexes game with simultaneous
moves.
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7.2.1 Classification of Games
Games are often classified into static, dynamic, cooperative, and non-cooperative
games. In static games, every player performs only one action, and all actions
are performed simultaneously. Static games can be represented with a payoff
matrix. In a two-player game, one player is called the row player and the
other is called the column player. In dynamic games, there is at least one
possibility of performing several actions in sequence. These types of games
are represented using the extensive form. In a cooperative game, players are
free to make binding agreements in pre-play communications. This means that
players can form coalitions. In non-cooperative games no binding agreements
are possible and each player plays for himself.
7.2.2 Formal Framework
N = 1, . . . , n is the set of players who choose actions and have preferences
over outcomes. Ai is the set of actions available to player i. An action profile
(a1, . . . , an) is an n-tuple of actions where each ai ∈ Ai is performed simul-
taneously. A strategy tells players what to do given background knowledge.
It is a function from sequences of previous events or histories to action sets5.
The binary relation i represents preference between profiles or payoff func-
tions. The payoff function ui maps profiles to real numbers. If (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n)
≺i (s1, . . . , sn) or ui(s′1, . . . , s′n) ≺ ui(s1, . . . , sn), then player i prefers strategy
profile (s′1, . . . , s
′
n) being played. The payoff profiles (u1, . . . , un) define the
5Actions are used in static games instead.
37
payoff function U of a game. U : A → Rn is a function mapping all actions
or strategy profiles to payoff profiles. If S = (s1, . . . , sn) is an action, strategy,
profile then S−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn). An action a1 strictly dominates
another action a2 if a1 is preferred to a2 in all possible courses of events.
7.2.3 Nash Equilibrium
Strategic games can be classified according to how much the payoff functions
of the players resemble each other. In zero-sum games also called strictly
competitive games the payoff of players sum up to zero; if one wins a certain
amount then the other loses it. A pure coordination game is the opposite of a
zero-sum game where the payoffs of the players are identical.
In a strategic game without uncertainty, what strategy will a rational
player choose? One way to answer this question is to say a player may just
eliminate all strictly dominated actions, and hope to find a single possible
move to choose. Strict strategy domination is based on players’ preferences
and is formalized as follows.
Definition 1: Strategy si of player i strictly dominates a strategy s’i if and
only if for all profiles s it holds that (s’i, s−i) ≺i (si, s−i).
Definition 2: A atrategy si of player i weakly dominates a strategy s’i if and
only if for all profiles s it holds that (s’i, s−i) i (si, s−i) and there is a profile
s such that (s’i, s−i) ≺i (si, s−i).
Nash equilibrium is a kind of solution concept of a game involving two
or more players, where no player has anything to gain by changing only his or
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her own strategy from unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and
no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players
keep theirs unchanged, then the set of strategy choices and the corresponding
payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3: A strategy profile s is a weak Nash equilibrium if and only if
for none of the players i there exists a strategy s’i such that s ≺i (s’i, s−i) or
equivalently if for all of i’s strategies s’i it holds that (s’i, s−i) i s. A strategy
profile is a strict Nash equilibrium if ≺i is used instead or si 6= s’i for the
second characterization.
There is another characterization in terms of best responses. A move si
of player i is a best response to a strategy profile s−i. We write si ∈ BRi(s−i),
if and only if ui(si, s−i) = maxs′i∈Si ui(s’i, s−i).
A strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium, if and only if for all i = (1, . . ., n) si
is a best response to s−i i.e. si ∈ BRi(s−i). It is strict if in addition BRi(s−i)
is a singleton set for all i.
A strategic game with mixed strategies is defined as follows. Let ∆(Ai)
be the set of probability distributions over Ai, i.e. the set of functions P that
assign a probability P (a) to each action a ∈ Ai such that
∑
a∈Ai P (a) = 1 and
0  P (a)  1. Each P ∈ ∆(Ai) corresponds to a mixed strategy of player i.
A mixed strategy profile is a sequence (P1, . . ., Pn) for the set of players N =
{1, . . ., n}. A pure strategy corresponds to a mixed strategy Piwhere Pi(a) =
1 for one action a ∈ Ai and Pi(b) = 0 for all other actions. We can calculate
the expected utility of player i given a mixed strategy profile P = (P1, . . .,
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Pn) and payoff profile (u1, . . ., un) by EUi(P) =
∑
a∈A1×...×An P1(a1) × . . .×
Pn(an) × ui(a).
It is assumed that rational players try to maximize their expected utili-
ties, i.e. a player i strictly prefers action a over action b exactly if the expected
utility of a is higher than the expected utility of b. For mixed strategy profiles
P = (P1, . . . , Pn), we use the same notation P−i as for pure strategy profiles to
denote the profile (P1, . . . , Pi−1, Pi+1, . . . , Pn) where we leave out the strategy
Pi. (P
′
i , P−i) denotes again the profile where we replaced Pi by P
′
i .
Defition 4: A weak mixed Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy profile (P1,
. . ., Pn) such that for all i = (1, . . . , n) and P’i∈ ∆(Ai) it holds that EUi(P’i
, P−i) ≤ EUi(P). A mixed Nash equilibrium is strict if we can replace ≤ by ≺
in the last condition.
A Nash equilibrium such as (a, a) is called strongly Pareto optimal, or strongly
Pareto efficient; more precisely, a Nash equilibrium s = (s1,. . ., sn) is strongly
Pareto optimal, if and only if there is no other Nash equilibrium s′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
n)
such that for all i = (1, . . . , n)ui(s) ≺ ui(s′). That is a Nash equilibrium is
strongly Pareto optimal if and only if there is no other equilibrium where every
player is better off.
7.2.4 Common Knowledge and Rationality Assumptions
The classical interpretation of game theory makes very strong assumptions
about the rationality of players. First, it is assumed that every player is log-
ically omniscient; they know all logical theorems and all logical consequences
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of their non-logical beliefs. Second, they are assumed to always act in their
enlightened self interest in the sense of utility maximization. Third, for a con-
cept like Nash equilibrium to make sense in classical game theory, it is assumed
that the structure of the game is common knowledge between players.
Mutual knowledge of a proposition α between players is when each
player knows α. For example, both Ann and Bob know α. Common knowledge
between two players of a proposition α is equivalent to two infinite chains of
knowledge of α. Ann knows that Bob knows that Ann knows that . . . α and
Bob knows that Ann knows that Bob knows that . . . α. Of course, human
beings are seldom able to go beyond just a few iterations of shared knowledge;
they can’t explicitly represent the infinite chain of knowledge.
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8 Communication Games
There are different models of a two-player communication game in economics
and game theory literature. In these models, one player (the sender or agent)
tries to communicate some private information (sender’s type) to another
player (the receiver or principle). These games model the difficulties that arise
under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information. Rasmusen [116]
divides communication games into different types. We’ll very briefly review
them here before discussing cheap talk games in detail.
8.1 Signaling
In signaling games, the sender’s message is costly and more costly when he lies
than tell the truth, but messages need not be truthful. The sender’s payoff
is affected even if the receiver ignores his message. The sender’s type varies
from bad to good in these models. If the sender’s type is better, it is cheaper
for him to send a message that his type is good. For example, a worker has a
given skill level and chooses the amount of effort he will exert. If the worker
knows this and can acquire credentials to signal his ability to an employer then
the problem is signaling.
8.2 Truthful Announcement
In truthful announcement games, the sender may be silent or send a message,
but the message must be truthful if it is sent. There is no cost to sending the
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message, but it may induce the receiver to take actions that affect the sender.
If the receiver ignores the message, the sender’s payoff is unaffected by the
message. An example of a truthful announcement game is when the sender’s
ability A is uniformly distributed on [0,1], and the sender can send a message
Y such as A > .5 or A = .2.
8.3 Auditing
In auditing games the sender’s message might or might not be costly and
receiver may audit the message at some cost to verify if the sender was lying.
An example is lobbying. The lobbyist can tell the truth or lie (in both cases
sending a costly message) to the politician. The politician can then investigate
the truth of the message at some cost.
8.4 Mechanism
Sender’s message might or might not be costly. Before the sender sends a
message he commits to a contract with the receiver. Decisions are based on
what they can observe and enforcement is based on what can be verified by
the courts. A mechanism is chosen before the sender observes the true state
(private information) otherwise the choice of mechanism itself may convey
some information. For example, if in the screening game the receiver commits
to his response to a signal it turns into a mechanism game.
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8.5 Screening
A screening game is closely related to signaling games where rather than choos-
ing an action based on a signal, the receiver gives the sender proposals based
on the type of the sender. The sender sends a message in response to an offer
by the receiver. For example, the employer offers a wage level first, at which
point the worker chooses the amount of credentials he will acquire (education
or skills) and accepts or rejects a contract for a wage level.
8.6 Cheap Talk
Farrell and Rabin [49] introduce cheap talk games. In economics, signaling
games have an associated cost. However, it is widely believed that most of
the information transmission in modern microeconomics is not done through
costly signaling systems but through ordinary cheap talk. Cheap talk6 is
an incomplete-information game that consists of costless, non-binding, non-
verifiable messages that may affect the listener’s beliefs but the message itself
does not directly affect the payoffs of the game. The receiver, after hearing
the message from the sender, must take an action, which decides the payoffs
for both players. The game proceeds as follows.
1. Nature decides S’s type t (the sender’s private information)
2. S observes t and sends a message m to R
6The peacock’s tail is an example of talk which is not cheap. The tail convinces the hens
that the peacock is a worthy suitor but the tail imposes cost by taking up resources and
making the peacock easier to catch.
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3. R does not know the sender’s type t but takes an action a based on his
prior beliefs about t and S’s message m
4. S’s type t and R’s action a decides the payoffs for both S and R
A self-signaling message is such that the speaker says it if and only if
it is true i.e. it is to the speaker’s benefit to tell the truth. A self-committing
message creates an incentive for the speaker to fulfill it. A message that is self-
signaling and self-committing seems credible. A credible message is believable
therefore the receiver can base its decision on it.
8.6.1 Cheap Talk About Private Information
Suppose Ann is a job applicant and Bob a potential employer who wants to
hire Ann for one of two positions, demanding and undemanding. Bob will give
Ann the demanding job if he believes her ability is high and the undemanding
job if he believes her ability is low. Bob does not know Ann’s ability. Ann
sends a message “High” or “Low” to Bob signaling her ability. Bob then
decides which job to give Ann. It is quite obvious that Ann has preferences
over Bob’s beliefs about her ability as Bob relies on those beliefs to take an
action. The normal form game for one version of this example is shown in
Figure 5.
Ann’s types, “High or “Low” are self-signaling and they coincide with
her true type. Therefore, Bob can make his job assignment depend on Ann’s
message. Since Ann has no incentive to lie, cheap talk conveys all of Ann’s
private information to Bob.
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Ann
Bob
D U
H 2,1 0, 0
L 0, 0 1,3
Figure 5: Normal form representation of the game where Ann’s type high (H)
or low (L) is self-signaling and Bob can make his job assignment based on Ann’s
message. That is hire Ann for the demeaning job (D) if she sends the message
“High” or undemanding job (U) if she sends the message “Low”.
Consider a modification of the game. Let’s assume that the demanding
job pays more and Ann is greedy. So Ann has an incentive to lie and get the
demanding job regardless of her ability. The game is shown in Figure 6.
Ann
Bob
D U
H 2, 1 0, 0
L 2, 0 1, 3
Figure 6: Normal form representation of the game where Ann’s type “High” or
“Low” is no longer correlated with Ann’s true type. And cheap talk fails to convey
Ann’s private information to Bob.
Ann’s preferences over Bob’s beliefs are no longer correlated with Ann’s
true type and types “High and “Low” are no longer self-signaling. Due to
lack of self-signaling and correlation cheap talk fails to convey Ann’s private
information to Bob.
In these two situations, correlation between the sender’s true type and
preference over the receiver’s beliefs is either perfect or fails completely. The
more interesting situation is of course where Ann and Bob’s preferences are
partially aligned. Can cheap talk be credible in problems where preferences
of the sender and the receiver are partially aligned? Crawford and Sobel [30]
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argue that not all games are coordination games and many difficulties with
reaching agreements are due to players having different information about
preferences. Sharing information helps in reaching potential agreements, but
it also has a strategic effect that revealing all information to an opponent
is not usually the most advantageous strategy. But even a selfish agent will
frequently find it beneficial to reveal some information. They showed that
limited common interest might lead to meaningful talk.
8.6.2 Crawford and Sobel’s Model
In Crawford and Sobel’s model, there are two players, the sender S and the
receiver R. The sender observes the value of a random variable m (S’s private
information or type), whose differentiable probability distribution function,
F (m), with density f(m), is supported on [0, 1]. The sender has a twice con-
tinuously differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U s(y,m, b),
where y, a real number, is the action taken by the receiver upon receiving
the sender’s signal and b is a scalar parameter used to measure how nearly
agents’ interests are aligned. The receiver’s twice continuously differentiable
von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function is denoted UR(y,m).
The assumptions are that for each m and for i = R, S, denoting partial
derivatives by subscripts in the usual way, Ui1(y,m) = 0 for some y, and U
i
11(.)
< 0, so that Ui has a unique maximum in y for each given (m,b) pair; and
that Ui12(.) > 0. The latter condition ensures that the best value of y from a
fully informed agent’s standpoint is a strictly increasing function of the true
value of m. All aspects of the game except m are common knowledge.
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The game proceeds as follows. The sender observes her type, m, and
sends a signal to the receiver; the signal may be random, and can be viewed as
a noisy estimate of m. The receiver processes the information in the sender’s
signal and chooses an action, which determines both players’ payoffs. In equi-
librium, each agent responds optimally to his opponent’s strategy choice, tak-
ing into account its implications in the light of his probabilistic beliefs, and
maximizing expected utility over his possible strategy choices. Formally, an
equilibrium consists of a family of signaling rules for S, denoted q(n|m), and
an action rule for R, denoted y(n), such that
1. For each m ∈ [0,1], ∫
N
q(n|m) dn = 1,
where the Borel set N is the set of feasible signals, and if n* is in the
support of q(.| m), then n* solves
max
n∈N
U s(y(n),m, b); and
2. For each n, y(n) solves
max
y
∫ 1
0
UR(y,m)p(m|n)dm,where
p(m|n) ≡ q(n|m) f(m) / ∫ 1
0
q(n|t)f(t)dt.
The first condition says that the sender’s signaling rule yields an expected-
utility maximizing action for each of his information types, taking the receiver’s
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action rule as given. The second condition says that the receiver responds op-
timally to each possible signal, using Bayes’ Rule to update his prior, taking
into account the sender’s signaling strategy and the signal he receives.
Crawford and Sobel characterized the set of equilibrium outcomes and
demonstrated that there is a finite upper bound, N*, to the number of distinct
actions that the receiver takes with positive probability in equilibrium, and
that for each N = 1, . . ., N*, there is an equilibrium in which the receiver
takes N actions. In addition, when monotonicity condition holds, for all N =
1, . . ., N*, there is a unique equilibrium outcome in which the receiver takes
N distinct actions with positive probability, and the expected payoffs for both
the sender and the receiver are strictly increasing in N. The equilibrium with
N* actions is the most informative equilibrium.
Let us look at the job applicant example in light of the Crawford and
Sobel’s model. Ann’s ability lies on a continuum rather than being binary
“High” or “Low.” Based on Bob’s beliefs about her ability, it will set her wage
and make workplace demands on her. If Bob believes Ann has high ability, he
will demand more work and pay more. Ann knows her ability, but Bob only
has his beliefs about Ann’s ability and what Ann says. Suppose Ann’s type
t is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Ann sends a message m and Bob chooses
an action a, where a and m are also ∈ [0, 1]. A message m may be a sentence,
“My type is t.” The payoffs are quadratic loss functions in which each player
has an ideal point and wants a to be close to the ideal point. Let UAnn =
−(a− (t+ b))2 and UBob = −(a− t)2 be the payoff functions for Ann and Bob,
respectively.
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At the extreme of payoff function similarity, it is clear what happens.
Suppose Bob wants a to be as close to t as possible. If Ann also wants a to
be close to t, then she will reveal her true type. This is called a separating
equilibrium. On the other hand, If Ann wants a to be as big as possible then
she will lie. The signal will convey no information and Bob will ignore Ann’s
message. This is called a pooling equilibrium.
Let’s say Ann wants to persuade Bob that her ability is somewhat
higher than it actually is. However, Ann doesn’t want to exaggerate too much.
The interesting question is what happens if Ann likes Bob’s ideal action to be
t + .1? So Ann doesnt want a to be too big, but she does want a to be bigger
than what Bob would choose if he was fully-informed about true state of the
world.
Crawford and Sobel showed that there exists a partially pooling equi-
librium in which Ann truthfully reports her type by reporting t is in the low
interval [0, x ] or the high interval [x, 1], say x = .3. So in effect, Ann reduces
her message space to two messages, Low and High.
Bob’s optimal strategy in a partially pooling equilibrium is to choose
his action to equal the expected value of the type in the interval the sender
has chosen. Thus, if m = 0, Bob will choose a = x/2 and if m = 1, he will
choose a = (x + 1)/2. Bob’s equilibrium response determines Ann’s payoffs
from her two messages. The payoffs between which she chooses are; UAnnm=0 =
−((t+ .1)− x
2
)2 and UAnnm=1 = −(1+x2 − (t+ .1))2.
There exists a value x such that if t = x, Ann is indifferent between
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m = 0 and m = 1, but if t is lower he prefers m = 0 and if t is higher he
prefers m = 1. To find x, equate UAnnm=0 and U
Ann
m=1 and simplify to obtain
(t + .1) − x
2
= 1+x
2
− (t + .1). We set t = x at the point of indifference, and
solving for x then yields x = .3.
Thus, the divergence in preferences of the sender and the receiver
coarsens the message space. Ann will not send a truthful precise message,
but if there is a partially pooling equilibrium, she will send a truthful coarse
message. If the true value of t is small, Ann will report the fairly precise
information that t lies in [0,.3]. If t is larger, it is harder to induce a truthful
message, since Ann has a tendency to exaggerate and report t larger than it
is.
If instead of wanting (t + .1) to be the action, the preferences of Ann
and Bob diverge more e.g (t + .8), then there would be the uninformative
pooling equilibrium. If they diverged less e.g (t + 0.001), then there would
exist other partially pooling equilibria that had more than just two effective
messages and would distinguish between three or more intervals instead of
between just two.
8.6.3 Cheap Talk Equilibria
Every cheap talk game has a babbling equilibrium where the sender’s message
does not affect the receiver’s beliefs and the receiver ignores the sender’s mes-
sage. The sender might as well make noises that are not related with her
type. In turn, Ann’s babbling justifies Bob’s strategy of ignoring her message
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and assigning the undemanding job, which is his best move given an expected
value of 50/50. It is always consistent with rationality to treat cheap talk as
meaningless. Farrell and Rabin [49] argue that people don’t usually take a de-
structive attitude, “I won’t presume words don’t mean what they have always
meant.” Rather people take the literal meaning as a starting point. The view
that cheap talk may be blocked by incredulity but not by incomprehension is
called the rich language assumption. It assumes that players share a common
language and are competent to work out the literal meaning of sentences.
8.6.4 Cheap Talk about Intentions
Can cheap talk be effective in coordination problems? Farrell and Rabin [49]
argue that if a message is credible, then cheap talk efficiently resolves coordi-
nation problems.
Suppose Bob hired Ann and now they work together. Ann and Bob
are planning to have lunch together. Ann leaves the office before Bob who will
join her later. Ann says to Bob, “I’m off to Eatery 2.”
Ann
Bob
Eatery1 Eatery2 Eatery3 Eatery4
Eatery1 3, 3 0, 0 0, 0 0,−2
Eatery2 0, 0 3,3 0, 0 0,−2
Eatery3 0, 0 0, 0 3, 3 0,−2
Eatery4 −2, 0 −2, 0 −2, 0 1, 1
Figure 7: A two-player coordination game.
Here, Ann’s message is self-signaling and self-committing and thus cred-
ible. If Ann’s message is credible then Bob believes it and his best response
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will be going to Eatery 2, a Nash equilibrium in this game.
8.6.5 Cheap Talk vs. Conventions
Let’s assume Bob did not hear Ann’s message about what Eatery she is heading
to but knows Ann left for lunch and she is waiting for him. Can Schelling’s
focal point help them coordinate?
Schelling’s focal point is best explained with following example, “Two
people planned to meet in New York but forgot to say where. The leading focal
point at the time was Grand Central Station. In this situation, each can infer
the other person would pick Grand Central Station as it is the natural focal
point.”
Suppose Ann and Bob go out for lunch quite often and they have a
favorite place where they usually eat. Then Bob can infer where Ann may be
waiting for him and try his luck but it is not guaranteed he will find her there.
Perhaps, Ann wanted to try another place that day. Going to the usual place
is better than no coordination but worse than what they can get by talking.
8.6.6 Coordination Under Conflict
Suppose Ann and Bob are working on a joint project where each prefers the
other to do more work. They both reason whether the other player uses high
effort or low effort while her/his own best response is low if the other uses high
effort. This leads to Nash equilibrium (6, 6), which is Pareto-dominated by
(7, 7), where both offer high effort. Can Ann and Bob talk their way out of
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this?
Ann
Bob
H L
H 7, 7 5, 8
L 8, 5 6,6
Figure 8: Strategic representation of a two-player game where Ann and Bob chooses
whether to put high (H) or low (L) effort in their joint project.
If Ann says, “I will put in high effort and I expect you to do the same,”
the message is not self-signaling as Ann likes Bob to put in high effort whatever
she plans to do. And it is not self-committing as Ann has no incentive to follow
through on her promise. Even if Bob believes Ann’s plan to put in high effort,
he will have no incentive to put in high effort himself. Whatever they say, low
effort remains a strictly dominant strategy. If there is conflict, messages are
less likely to be self-signaling or self-committing and cheap talk will be less
successful or less informative.
8.6.7 Conflict in Talk
Suppose Ann and Bob have become good friends and would like to spend an
evening together. Both would rather spend the evening together than apart.
Bob would like them be together at the prizefight, while Ann would like them
be together at the opera, and both players can talk in the game. Can they
reach an agreement through cheap talk?
If Ann says, “I’m going to the opera,” and Bob says, “I’m going to
the opera,” these messages are self-signaling and self-committing and they
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Ann
Bob
O F
O 2, 1 0, 0
F 0, 0 1, 2
Figure 9: Strategic representation of a two-player game where Ann and Bob choose
between opera (O) and prizefight (F).
reinforce each other. It is likely they will continue as in the game of pure
coordination. However, if Ann says, “I’m going to the opera,” while Bob
says, “I’m going to the fight,” each message individually is self-signaling and
self-enforcing but they conflict. Unless it’s common knowledge between them
who’s in charge, they can’t coordinate.
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9 Game Theory and Pragmatics
Communication is a goal-oriented activity where interlocutors use language
as a means to achieve an end while taking into account the goals and plans
of others. Game theory, being the scientific study of strategically interactive
decision making, provides the mathematical tools for modeling language use
among rational decision makers. In a game, there are at least two players
who interact with each other and it results in a certain outcome. Each player
has a choice between various courses of action, their strategies. Each player
has a preference ordering over expected outcomes. Preferences are usually
encoded as numerical values called utilities or payoffs assigned to possible
outcomes. One of the objectives of game theory is to derive insights into how
rational players ought to behave in a strategic situation. A rational player is
said to hold some consistent beliefs about the structure of the game and the
strategies of other players, and they will choose their strategy in such a way
that their expected utility is maximized. Also, rational players are assumed to
be logically omniscient i.e. they take all logical consequences of their beliefs
into account in their decisions. It is common knowledge among the players
that all players are rational in this sense.
Application of game theory to communication has recently attracted
attention for two reasons. First, communication between players may affect
the outcome of the game. Second, communication itself can be analyzed as a
game.
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9.1 Equilibrium Semantics
Prashant Parikh [94] present a new account for language meaning called equi-
librium semantics. In a game, an equilibrium means balance amongst multi-
ple interacting elements. Parikh argues that for language equilibrium enters
through the element of choice. The speaker must choose his utterance and
the addressee must choose her interpretation and these choices must be in
equilibrium for information exchange to take place. A speaker and addressee
participate in multiple games at multiple levels in a single utterance so there
are multiple equilibria that occur in communication. Thus, not only does the
equilibrium involve a balance amongst the choices and strategies available to
the speaker and addressee in each game, but also the multiple equilibria are
themselves in balance, an equilibrium of equilibria. Situated games of par-
tial information can be used as a mathematical framework to model language
games taking into account choice and strategic interaction as fundamental
properties of linguistic and communication systems.
There are the following sets of constraints called SCIF: Syntactic (S),
Conventional (C), Informational (I), and Flow (F). S is some account of syntax
of the language being considered that interacts and is influenced by meaning
and plays a role in derivation of content. C is a set of conventional constraints
that maps every word into one or more properties or relations - these can be
extracted from a dictionary and is independent of context. I maps the prop-
erties and relations obtained from the conventional map into certain special
situation-theoretic objects determined by S and part of the information space
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or ontology relative to a context or utterance situation u. This map is called
the informational map and S influences its behavior. Finally, F embodies
much of the equilibrium semantics. It is essentially a system of situated games
provided a model of utterance situation u, so that together with the sentence
and its phrase structure, one can infer its meaning. Equilibrium in semantics
is defined in terms of these four sets of constraints being in equilibrium within
each constraint and across constraints, both in the context of the system of
meaning and in the context of utterance.
s
t’
b,a
F
c,c
M
F
t
c,c
F
a,b
M
M
Figure 10: Battle of the sexes game.
Going back to the battle of the sexes example, imagine a situation
where Ann and Bob are married and sitting in the living room negotiating
their plans for the evening i.e. whether to go to a movie or a football match
together. The extensive form for this game is shown in Figure 10. Assume the
movie Emma is playing in the theaters. Ann and Bob’s daughter Emma, who
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happens to have the same name as the movie, is playing with her siblings in
the living room. In this context Ann utters, “Emma is playing.” This sentence
when spoken is ambiguous. On the intended reading, Ann is noting that the
movie “Emma” is showing at some theater. On another reading, it could
be an observation that their daughter Emma is playing. All Ann and Bob
know is the first interpretation is more likely based on the fact that they are
discussing what to do this evening. A game can be constructed to model this
communication scenario between Ann and Bob.
Let’s call this utterance situation u. Since disambiguation is a selection
of one meaning from many, we need to lay out all possible meanings of the
sentence uttered by Ann. For simplicity, let δ = Emma 7, we need to find
out what the possible meanings of δ are in situation u. The Conventional
Constraint (C) is a map from a word ω to one or more conventional meanings
P ω. The Information Constraint (I) takes properties associated with a word
and maps them into contextually appropriate possible meanings. Let σ and
σ’ stand for the possible meanings of δ in utterance situation u; where σ
means film and σ’ means Ann and Bob’s daughter. The Flow Constraint (F)
is given with the extensive form game of partial information; s is an initial
situation represented by a node that contains the setting u together with
Ann’s intention to convey σ. In s, Ann can utter the ambiguous word δ =
Emma, this action is being represented by the relevant arrow issuing from this
situation. If she does indeed utter δ, the resulting situation is t, where Bob
has to choose an interpretation of δ in u. Each action corresponding to two
7One can also represent the sentence as a conjunction of words, we’ll use a single word
for simplification.
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possible interpretations, σ and σ’ are represented by corresponding arrows.
s
t
. . .
σ’
. . .
σδ
t” . . .
σ
δ’
s’
t”’ . . .
σ’
δ”
t’
. . .
σ’
. . .
σ
δ
Figure 11: A lexical game.
Since δ is ambiguous, there is an alternative counterfactual situation s’
that also contains u, together with the alternative possible intention to convey
σ’ and u = s ∩ s’. In s’ also Ann can utter δ and this results in t’, where Bob
again has the same two choices of interpretation. {t, t’} forms an information
set for Bob because he is not able to distinguish between the two situations.
δ’ and δ” stands for an alternative locution that the speaker might have
uttered but chose not to e.g. δ’ could be “The film Emma” and δ” could be
“Our daughter Emma.” Since these two are unambiguous, there is just one
interpretation that Bob can choose, either σ or σ’.
Additionally probabilities can be assigned to express the likelihood of
one utterance meaning over another. Let ρ and ρ’ stand for probabilities
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that Ann is conveying σ or σ’ in s or s’. Since Ann’s intention is to convey
information about the movie Emma, both Ann and Bob can infer that ρ > ρ’
given the context of the utterance. Finally, the payoffs for Ann and Bob can
come from the embedding situation u as well as from the language and can
depend on a variety of factors such as their beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and
on the language and it’s rules. Thus the payoffs are a complex resultant of
positive and negative factors. The payoffs vary greatly between players based
on the situation they are in and their varying characters and these assignments
at a given situation will decide the Nash equilibria for the game, which will
give the intended meaning for the utterance δ in situation u.
9.2 Gricean Meaning and Game Theory
Stalnaker [138] connects Grice’s work with game theory using the dynamics of
best responses in cheap talk games. Stalnaker defines credibility of messages
as follows.
1. A message is prima facie rational (pf rational) for player S of type t, if
and only if S prefers that R believe the content of the message, S prefers
that R believe the message rather than remain in his prior belief state
which is assumed to uniformly distributed.
2. The definition of credibility in terms of pf rationality is that a message
is credible if and only if it is pf rational for some types, and only for
types for which it is true.
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3. It is common belief that the content of any credible message that is sent
by S is believed by R.
4. The structure of the game is common belief, and it is common belief that
both players are rational, that they make choices that maximize their
expected utility.
Ann
Bob
a1 a2 a3 a4
t1 5, 5 10, 10 0, 0 0, 0
t2 5, 5 0, 0 0, 6 1, 8
t3 5, 5 0, 0 6, 6 0, 0
Figure 12: Normal representation of the game between Ann and Bob where Ann
sends a cheap talk message signaling her type t1, t2, or t3 to Bob and Bob takes an
action a1, a2, a3, or a4 based on his beliefs about Ann’s type and Ann’s message.
In the game shown in Figure 12, if Ann is of type t2, then her first choice
is that Bob get no information and remains in the prior belief state because
that would motivate him to choose a1. But this option is not available since it
is clear that the message “My type is t1” is a credible message that Ann would
be rationally required to send if and only if she was of type t1. Therefore,
Bob can infer that Ann is not t1 if he does not get that message. In this case,
sending no message would induce the belief that Ann is either t2 or t3. And if
Bob didn’t know which of the two it was, it would result in action a3, which
is a worst outcome for t2. But if t2 is able to reveal her type, Bob will instead
choose a4. And if Ann is of type t2, she would prefer this to a3. So the message,
“My type is t2,” is pf rational for t2, since Ann prefers that Bob believe that
message to the feasible alternatives to believing it. Since this message is pf
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rational only for t2, it is credible. The definitions ensure that Ann will reveal
her actual type if she is t1 or t2, and that Bob will believe her and respond
appropriately.
The example shows that sending no message may reveal information,
whether the sender wants to reveal it or not. It is also true that sending a
credible message may reveal more information than is contained in the explicit
content of the message. Sometimes a message that is credible in one model
of a given game is not credible in other models of the same game. Let’s look
at the game shown in Figure 13. Assume that there are just two available
messages: “My type is t1” or “My type is not t1.”
Ann
Bob
a1 a2 a3
t1 5, 5 0, 0 0, 0
t2 5, 5 0, 6 0, 0
t3 5, 5 6, 6 8, 8
Figure 13: Normal representation of the game between Ann and Bob where Ann
sends a cheap talk message signaling her type t1, t2, or t3 to Bob and Bob takes an
action a1, a2, or a3 based on his beliefs about Ann’s type and Ann’s message.
The second message is pf rational for t3, and not for t1 or t2. So it is
credible, but will not be sent by t2. The first message is not credible, since if
Ann is of type t2, the message would be false, but she might have an incentive
to send it, and tempted even more if it is required that one of the two messages
be sent. Here we have a case where the meaning of the messages diverges from
what the messages literally say. Even though the first message literally means
that “My type is t1,” it will manifestly express Ann’s intention to induce the
belief that she is either t1 or t2, and will succeed in doing this. It will not
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credibly communicate its literal content, but it will credibly convey something
weaker. And since it will be mutually recognized that the second message
will be sent only by t3, it will induce the stronger belief that it is manifestly
intended to induce, that “My type is t3.
Ann
Bob
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
t1 −5, 9 −5, 0 5, 8 0, 3 0, 6
t2 −5, 0 −5, 9 0, 3 5, 8 0, 6
Figure 14: Normal representation of the game between Ann and Bob where Ann
sends a cheap talk message signaling her type t1 or t2 to Bob and Bob takes an action
a1, a2, a3, a4, or a5 based on his beliefs about Ann’s type and Ann’s message.
Assume that Ann is of type t1 in the game shown in Figure 14. Ideally,
Ann would like to convince Bob to choose a3, giving her a payoff of 5 rather
than 0, which is what she would get if she did nothing to change Bob’s prior
50/50 beliefs. If she could somehow change Bob’s belief to 2/3, rather than
1/3, in the hypothesis that she is of type t1 , then Bob would make this choice.
But what can Ann say to accomplish this? Stalnaker suggests that Ann might
try revealing some, but not all, of the evidence that she is of type t1 , or she
might say something that could be taken to be evidence for this, but that
might mean something else. She might say something that Bob already knows
to be true, but that might give some support to the conjecture that Ann said
it because she is of type t1. But if Bob fully believes she is of type t1, in
which case he would choose a1, giving Ann a payoff of -5, and given that it is
common knowledge that Ann knows whether she is of type t1 or type t2, Ann
would be taking a risk if she made such an attempt.
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Application of Game Theory to linguistics has attracted attention by
other researchers. Parikh and Ramanujam [100] present a knowledge based
model of communication where meaning of messages are given in terms of how
it affects the knowledge of other agents involved in the communication. Ja¨ger,
Benz, Rooji [71][91] connects Gricean ideas to game theory and characterize
players’ moves in terms of their best responses to each other in a game setting.
Ja¨ger [71] shows the existence of Nash equilibrium in communication games.
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10 Deception in Games
In classical game theory, it is assumed that each person acts selfishly to obtain
the highest possible well-being for himself and is unconcerned about the well-
being of others. It is widely accepted that we live in a world of deception
where people lie in everyday conversations whenever the outcome from lying
outweighs the outcome from telling the truth.
10.1 Politics
Consider an election game with two phases, the state primaries and the general
election. All players in the game belong to one of two parties, Democratic or
Republican. In the state primaries, candidates must beat other candidate
from their own party to become a nominee and proceed to the general election
where they must beat the opposite party nominee to become the president. All
players in the game act rationally to satisfy their goals. Rationality is defined
along the following terms. A rational voter’s goal is to pick a candidate closest
to its favorite position. A rational candidate’s goal is to choose a position that
maximizes the total number of votes (s)he receives, considering the voter’s
rationality.
Brams [21] argues that given a two-candidate game and a distribution
of favorite positions, the best position the candidates can choose is the median
in the sense that if one candidate is at the median and the other not, then
the candidate occupying the median position wins. If both occupy a median
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position, then this should result in a tie, although, typically this will not
happen as other factors like race, gender, or a candidate’s previous record
may come in.
6
-
Ann
→
Md Bob
α
X1
Y
0
Let X represent voters’ favorite positions and Y the number of voters.
Then if Ann and Bob are the two presidential candidates, by choosing Md
(the median) Ann beats Bob as the area between [0, α] > [α, 1].
The presidential election game illustrate an important phenomenon.
In a signaling game, where there is potential for information transmission,
the sender can manipulate information without being detected to control the
receiver’s decision. In this sense, the sender has an invisible power over the
receiver’s beliefs.
Economists have done experiments to see how lying varies based on
different factors.
10.2 Lying Aversion
Gneezy [62] conducts some experiments in order to empirically study the ef-
fect of consequences on behavior. He runs three treatments of a two-player
experiment where there are only two possible outcomes, Ai and Bi, in each
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treatment i = 1, 2, 3. The actual choice between the options is made by
player two (the receiver) and only player one (the sender) is informed about
the monetary consequences of each option. The only information player two
has about the payoffs prior to making her choice is the message that player
one decides to send. This message could either be “Option Ai will earn you
more money than option Bi” or “Option Bi will earn you more money than
option Ai.” In all three treatments, option Ai gives a lower monetary payoff
to the sender and a higher monetary payoff to the receiver than option Bi and
the receiver does not know this. Therefore, if sender sends the second message
it can be considered as telling a lie, whereas sending the first message can be
considered as telling the truth. The different monetary allocations (in dollars)
in the three treatments are as listed below, where a pair (x, y) indicates that
the sender would receive x and receiver would receive y.
A1 = (5,6) and B1 = (6,5);
A2 = (5,15) and B2 = (6,5);
A3 = (5,15) and B3 = (15,5).
Gneezy compares people’s behavior in two different settings; a deceptive
game where a person can tell the truth and obtains an allocation that is more
equitable and generous to the subject he is matched with, or a dictator game
where a person lies and obtains a selfish allocation. The reason for setting up
a dictator game in addition to a deceptive game is to determine the extent to
which the results of the deceptive games reflect an aversion to lying as opposed
to preferences over monetary distributions. Gneezy uses the control dictator
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game in which player one has the role of dictator and chooses between two
the options, while player two has no choice. Again, three treatments were
run, corresponding to exactly the same options of the three treatments of the
deception games.
Gneezy’s results showed that a significant fraction of people display
an aversion to lying or deception. The fraction of subjects who chose the
selfish allocation in the dictator game were higher than the fraction who made
the same choice in the deception game by lying. Whether a sender would
lie or tell the truth depends on what beliefs he holds about his partner’s
responses to his message. His results suggested that people generally expect
their recommendations to be followed, i.e. they expect their partner to choose
the option that they say will earn the partner more money. In this context,
lies are expected to work. Gneezy also showed that people not only care about
their own gain from lying, they are sensitive to the harm that lying may cause
the other side. Fewer people lied when the monetary loss from lying was
higher for their partner, but the monetary gain remained the same for them.
Similarly, fewer people lied when their own monetary gain decreased, while
the loss for their partner remained the same.
10.3 Social Preferences and Lying Aversion
Harkens and Kartik [69] reinterpret the evidence on deception presented by
Gneezy. They present their own hypothesis, “People are one of two kinds:
either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the
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outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This
implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth telling,
a person’s decision of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other
changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily
gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner.” It is believed to
be an important hypothesis to test since if it is right people can be categorized
as one of two types: either they are ethical and never lie, or they are economical
and lie whenever they prefer the allocation obtained by lying. Harkens and
Kartik claim that conditional on preferring the outcome from lying, a person
may be completely insensitive to how much he gains or how much his partner
loses from the lie. That is people’s social preferences influence whether they
actually prefer the outcome from lying relative to truth-telling, independent
of any aversion to lying.
In order to test their hypothesis they ran new but similar experiments
to Gneezy at the Universitat autonomy de Barcelona in Spain where subjects
were college students. They had all subjects play both the deception game and
the dictator game unlike Gneezy’s experiment where subjects played only one
or the other game. And both games were played with same set of monitory
payoffs, but each player was matched with a different partner for each. They
believed it was important to have a within subject design to directly compare
any subject’s behavior in the deception game with her preference over alloca-
tion as revealed by her choice in the dictator game. They also conducted the
experiment using the strategy method for player two in the deceptive game;
rather than telling receiver what the message sent by sender is, they asked the
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receivers which option they would pick contingent on each of the two possible
messages from the sender. This was to directly observe a receiver’s strategy.
Finally they conducted two different treatments
A4 = (4,12) and B4 = (5,4);
A5 = (4,5) and B5 = (12,4).
Treatment 4 is similar to Gneezy’s treatment 2 in the sense that option
B entails a small gain for player one (sender/dictator) and a big loss for player
two, relative to option A. Treatment 5 is substantially distinct from any of
Gneezy’s treatments because option B results in a big gain for player one and
only a small loss for player two. If lying induces outcome B whereas telling
the truth induces outcome A, as is suggested by Gneezy’s data, and if the
decision whether to lie or not depends on the relative gains and losses even
conditional on preferring the outcome from lying, then one would expect to
find that the proportion of lies among the selfish subjects in treatment 5 is
significantly higher than in treatment 4.
Their results confirmed that the proportion of selfish subjects in treat-
ment 5 was significantly higher than in treatment 4. It also showed that the
proportion of lies in the deceptive game was significantly lower than the pro-
portion of selfish choices. Additionally, they found that subjects in Spain were
less willing to follow the recommendations they received. Instead, recommen-
dations were often ignored or even inverted. Senders seem to have been aware
of the possibility that lies would often not be believed and not work. Their
data did not reject their hypothesis but confirmed Gneezy’s results on the
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existence of lying aversion.
10.4 Social Ties and Lying Aversion
Chakravarty et al [23] run experiments to see the interaction between social
ties and deceptive behavior with a modified sender and receiver game in which
a sender obtains a private signal regarding the value of a state variable and
sends a message related to the value of this state variable to the receiver. The
sender is allowed to be truthful or to lie. The receiver can take no action,
which eliminates strategic deception. Additionally, subjects (senders) are not
restricted to choose between truth telling and a unique type of lies but are
allowed to choose from a distinct set of allocations that embodies a multi-
dimensional set of potential lies. They implement two treatments: one in
which players are anonymous to each other (strangers); and one in which
players know each other from outside the experimental laboratory (friends).
They find that individuals are less likely to lie to friends than to strangers; and
that they have different degrees of lying aversion and that they lie according
to their social preferences.
Aoki et al [8] studies the effect of anonymous vs. non-anonymous in-
teraction. They investigate lying behavior and the behavior of people who are
deceived by using a deception game in both anonymity and face-to-face treat-
ments. Subjects consist of students and non-students to investigate whether
lying behavior is depended on socioeconomic backgrounds. To explore how
liars feel about lying, they give senders a chance to confess their behavior to
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their counter partner for the guilty aversion of lying. Their results showed
that the frequency of lying behavior for students was higher than that for
non-students at a payoff in the anonymity treatment, but that was no sig-
nificant difference between the anonymity and face-to-face treatments. Lying
behavior was not influenced by gender. Frequency of confession was higher in
the face-to-face treatment than in the anonymity treatment. And the receivers
who were deceived were more likely to believe a sender’s message to be true
in the anonymity treatment.
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11 Research Questions
The models of communication reviewed in the forgoing are based on the clas-
sical interpretation of game theory, which make strong assumptions about
the rationality of players. First, it is assumed that every player is logically
omniscient i.e. they know all logical theorems and all logical consequences
of their non-logical beliefs. Second, they are assumed to always act in their
self-interest maximizing utility. Third, for the concept of Nash equilibrium to
work, it is assumed that the form of the game is common knowledge between
players. Each player relies on the rationality of others without doubt and
relies on other players relying on her rationality and so on. The models are
often oversimplified and fail to adequately describe real-world communication
dynamics. Valid questions arise as to whether these assumptions are realistic
and the models reasonable.
11.1 Rationality Assumptions
Traditionally, reasoning has been thought of as conforming to rules and ac-
cepted procedures. How well someone engages in reasoning has been viewed as
a major factor in the extent to which the person is rational. Psychologists have
attempted, in a number of different experiments [6], to determine whether or
not people are capable of rational thought. In a majority of these experiments
subjects made inferences that did not logically follow from the premises. For
example, when subjects were told to assume, “All A are B,” and then asked
wither it followed that “All B are A” must be true, false, or could be either.
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A majority of subjects did not approximate a classical interpretation of the
quantifiers. In similar studies, subjects concluded, “Some A are not B” from
the premise “Some A are B” ([6], p. 230).
The premise that human beings are rational-utility maximizing indi-
viduals is subject to significant qualification as well. Fukuyama ([56], p. 19)
explains that the most basic definition of utility is a narrow one associated
with Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832) who defines utility as the pursuit of plea-
sure and avoidance of pain. People want to be able to consume the largest
quantity of the good things in life. However, there are numerous occasions
when people pursue other goals than utilities. They have been known to run
into burning houses to save others, die in the battle, or throw away careers so
that they can commune with nature somewhere in the mountains. People dont
just think utility but also have ideas that certain things are just and unjust,
and their choices follow accordingly.
Common knowledge is another rigid assumption that is up for question.
Common knowledge is different from mutual knowledge. Mutual knowledge
of a proposition α between two players is when each player knows α, whereas
common knowledge between two players of a proposition α is equivalent to
two infinite chains of knowledge of α; all know that they know that they know
α, and so on ad infinitum. With finite memory and processing capabilities,
human beings do not go beyond 2-3 levels.
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11.2 Oversimplified Model
A large proportion of the literature models signaling between two players; the
sender and the receiver. This oversimplification has restricted our view to a
narrow one. In a two-player game, the number of states, acts, and signals are
often assumed to be the same. There are obviously other possibilities such as
extra signals, or too few signals, or not enough acts. All these possibilities raise
interesting questions. Needless to say that even adding a third player who is
an audience to a two-player signaling game changes the game dynamics.
Skyrms[134] argues that there are other possible cases for a signaling
game. In the simplest possible case, one sender sends signals to one receiver.
S R
Another simple topology involves multiple senders and one receiver. For
example, two senders may observe different partitions of the possible states and
sends signals to one receiver.
R S’S
Suppose nature flips a coin and presents the receiver with one or another
decision problem. The receiver sends one of two signals to sender. The sender
selects one of two partitions of the state of nature to observe. Nature flips a
coin and presents the sender with the true state. The sender sends one of two
signals to the receiver. The receiver chooses one of two acts. Here a question
and answer signaling system can guarantee that the receiver always does the
right thing. This is a case where information flows in both directions.
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S R
A sender may send information to several receivers. Consider the case,
where a third individual is eavesdropping. In a more demanding setup, the
sender sends separate signals to multiple receivers who then have to perform
complementary acts for everyone to get paid. For instance, each receiver must
choose one of two acts, and the sender observes one of four states of nature
and sends one of two signals to each receiver. Each combination of acts pays
off in exactly one state.
S R’R
Senders may form chains where they pass information from one to the
next. In one scenario, the first individual observes the state and signals the
state, and the second observes the signal and signals the third, which must
perform the right act to ensure a common payoff.
R R’S
There is no requirement that the second individual sends a message
that has the same content as the original signal that she received. In this case,
the second sender might function as a translator from one signaling system to
another.
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11.3 Avoiding Difficult Problems
Deception is a real problem in signaling games. Deception is when the sender
systematically manipulates the signal to his benefit or to the detriment of the
receiver. It is different from misinformation where a signal is sent as a result
of a mistake.
In any game where there is potential for information transmission, a
sender can manipulate information without being detected to control a re-
ceivers decision for his own selfish interest. A pure utility-based approach to
signaling assumes players will always act selfishly and deceive others as long
as they get a higher payoff. However, empirical studies show that people don’t
often take a deceptive attitude [62] and they seem to show an aversion to lying.
The current models of signaling do not account for these results.
To be able to describe the dynamics of information exchange in sig-
naling games, we need to model communication in a less idealized way. This
thesis focuses on the topology where the sender sends information to the re-
ceiver in the presence of an audience. In our work, we will address some of
the questions raised in this section.
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12 Hypothesis Development
A few years ago, a colleague struggling to debug his Java code approached me
for help. He was in the middle of describing the bug when a manager passed
by, at which point, he shifted the topic of his conversation to techniques for
optimizing SQL queries.
My colleague was killing two birds with one stone, seeking my help in
fixing his buggy Java code while implying his SQL expertise to the manager.
Here the manager was indirectly involved in the conversation and whether he
can be considered an eavesdropper depends on his intentions.
In an explicit case of eavesdropping, an audience secretly listens to
the private conversation of others without their consent. Eavesdropping is
not limited to the traditional communication methods but also other forms
of communication such as telephone, email, instant messaging, etc. that are
considered private.
12.1 Virtual Communication
For better or worse, the Internet and social media have changed communication
forever. E-mails, texts, blogs, Facebook, Twitter, etc. have made virtual
communication today’s reality. Virtual communication has opened the door to
billions of people creating, replicating, and sharing information every second,
minute, hour of the day across the entire globe; a self-reinforcing cycle that is
leading to a tsunami of bytes submerging our world.
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12.1.1 Social Networks
There was a time when people would say, “you are what you eat,” but nowa-
days, “you are who you know online.” In this new era, we have taken our social
lives online. Social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn
(to name a few) have crossed borders enabling people to create online commu-
nities.
Facebook, an online social networking site, connects people with friends
and others who work, study, or live around them. People use Facebook to
share photos, videos, and keep up with each other. As of December 31st
2011, Facebook reported 845 million active users worldwide, more than 100
billion friend connections, 250 million photos uploaded per day, 2.7 billion
likes and comments per day, and a revenue of $3.71 billion in 2011, up from
$1.97 billion in 2010. On February 1st 2012, Facebook filed for a $5 billion
initial public offering [4]. Facebook’s future looks promising as more and
more people join the network. Facebook shareholder and portfolio manager of
Firsthand Technology Value Fund, Kevin Landis, told The New York Times
[45], “Facebook will have more traffic than anyone else, and they’ll have more
data than anyone else.”
As of June 2011, Twitter reported over 300 million users [145] and rev-
enue of $140 million in 2010 [85]. TechCrunch has projected that at the end of
2013; Twitter will have 1 billion users, $1.54 billion in revenue, 5,200 employees
and $111 million in net earnings [9]. Twitter has evolved the way we use lan-
guage, people communicating at each other rather than communicating with
80
each other. Twitter is not considered to embody two-way discussions. How-
ever, one thing is for sure that it has made information flow faster than ever.
In the Twitter echo system, it takes few users with large number of followers
to share something and with a click those followers share the information with
their followers and it is all over the Internet. Twitter has been used as a tool
in citizen uprisings and fundraising efforts for crisis situations.
When people post millions of tweets every day, within that stream are
some valuable pieces of information that can only come together when we act
in aggregate. A recent study [137] by medical researchers at Harvard showed
that Twitter was substantially faster at tracking the spread of cholera in Haiti
following the earthquake in 2010 than any traditional diagnostic method. By
using information from Twitter, researchers were able to pinpoint outbreaks
of the deadly disease more than two weeks before they were identified by tra-
ditional methods. At the other extreme, Twitter is the ground where Internet
hokum can grow beyond prevention. The spread of apparently impressive or
legitimate but actually untrue and nonsense content cannot be overlooked.
LinkedIn, a business-related social networking site, reported 150 million
users in 2010 and the site’s revenue as $243 million [2]. The site has focused
on providing professionals with a means to manage their professional identity,
engage with their professional network, and access insights into opportunities.
LinkedIn has taken professional networks online, providing access to people,
jobs, and opportunities.
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12.1.2 The Inevitable Audience
These social networking services do not charge a fee and neither do they pro-
duce anything. They just enable you to communicate with each other and
form social networks similar to what you have in real life. By doing so, you
signal information, whether explicitly or implicitly, about who you are, what
you like, who are in your social circle, and the cycle continues through oth-
ers replicating, distributing, and creating feedback. The theory pioneered by
American economist Paul Samuelson, called revealed preferences, says that one
can know what is useful by what people reveal to be useful by their choices.
Though not very obvious to an individual, the aggregate has created
great opportunity for certain groups. The New York Times reports, “Accord-
ing to Facebook, in December 2011, an advertiser could reach an estimated
audience of more than 65 million United States users in a typical day on Face-
book, compared with American Idol reaching an audience of 29 million people
with its 2011 season finale.” [3]
Have you noticed the same advertisement pop up on different websites
you visit? An advertisement tailored to your preferences timed so well that you
couldn’t possibly resist. Serendipity? No. There are a number of technology
companies collecting data on people’s online activity. The process starts with
dropping cookies in user’s browser, segmenting users based on collected data,
and serving them customized ads.
Micro targeting is not unique to commercial advertising. On February
21st 2012, The New York Times [5] reported that political campaigns are now
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building customized ads based on online data. The campaigns are aiming ads
at potential supporters based on where they live, the websites they visit, and
their voting records.
In recent primaries, two kinds of Republican voters have been seeing
two different Mitt Romney video ads pop up on local and national
news websites. The first, called “It’s Time to Return American
Optimism,” showed the candidate on the campaign trail explaining
how this was an election “to save the soul of America.” It was
aimed at committed party members to encourage a large turnout.
The second video ad, geared toward voters who have not yet aligned
themselves with a candidate, focused more on Mr. Romney as a
family man. Versions of the two ads were seen online in Florida,
Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina.
This type of micro targeting uses the same techniques that commercial
advertisers use for customized ads. For example, serving up hotel ads to people
who had shopped for vacations recently. Except, here it allows campaigns to
put specific messages in front of specific voters. “Two people in the same house
could get different messages,” Mr. Moffatt said. “Not only will the message
change, the type of content will change. [5]
Social networks are used by some lenders to evaluate loan requests [73].
The New York Observer reports that, a new wave of startups is working on al-
gorithms gathering data for banks from the web of associations on the Internet
known as “the social graph,” in which people are “nodes” connected to each
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other by “edges.” From the perspective of the banks, “birds of a feather flock
together.” If your friends are upstanding citizens who pay off their loans, you
will be, too. And vice versa, if you’re responsible then your friends are too and
they can be approached as potential clients. Although these algorithms maybe
a few years away from being used by major banks, smaller institutions such
as micro lender Lenddo are already using an algorithm based on input from a
person’s various social networks. When you register with a bank using such
a system, you would be required to verify your network logins, for example,
Facebook. Information from your accounts would be fed into the algorithm
and the bank would make a decision based on your online data. Information
that will contribute to systematic discrimination where certain segments of
the population could be refused loans or charged higher rates based on racial,
religious, sexual, or other prejudice.
“A picture is worth a thousand words.” Employers review publicly avail-
able social network profiles to learn more about job candidates. But often users
set their profiles private making it available only to people in their network.
Recently, a few companies and government agencies have gone beyond just
glancing at your social networking profiles. They have asked for username
and password to gain full access to the individual’s digital history. Employers
have asked job candidates to provide their Facebook login information during
interviews. “Bassett, a New York City statistician, had just finished answer-
ing a few character questions when the interviewer turned to her computer
to search for his Facebook page. But she couldn’t see his private profile. She
turned back and asked him to hand over his login information.” In another
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instance: “When Collins returned from a leave of absence from his job as a se-
curity guard with the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services in 2010, he was asked for his Facebook login and password during a
reinstatement interview, purportedly so the agency could check for any gang
affiliations.” [150] Sears is one of the companies offering an opportunity for
future jobs by letting applicants logging into the Sears job site through Face-
book. This allows Sears to draw information from candidate’s profile, such as
friend lists. You may opt out of such an interview or process but “if you need
to put food on the table for your three kids, you can’t afford to stand up for
your belief.” [150]
On June 5th 2013, Edward Snowden, a technical specialist who has
contracted for the NSA and works for the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton,
revealed large-scale surveillance of Internet user data by the National Security
Agency, in a program known as PRISM [59]. The New York times [147] claims
that some of the leading companies, including Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, Apple
and Facebook, apparently made it easier for the National Security Agency to
gain access to their data. On June 9th, 2013, Jameel Jaffer writes in The New
York Times [70].
“The Guardian revealed that the government has directed Verizon
Business Network Services to hand over an array of sensitive in-
formation about every domestic and international phone call made
by its customers in the United States over a three-month period.
The directive, sanctioned by the secretive court that oversees gov-
ernment surveillance in some national security cases, requires Ver-
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izon to tell the government who made each call, whom they called,
when they made the call, how long the call lasted, and (maybe)
where the parties to the call were located . . . As if that weren’t
enough, The Guardian and The Washington Post also revealed last
week that the N.S.A. has secured direct access to the major Inter-
net companies’ central servers. There seems to be some confusion
about precisely what the N.S.A. is doing with that access, but The
Washington Post reports that the agency is collecting information
about surveillance targets believed (with 51 percent certainty) to be
outside the United States and about people one and two degrees re-
moved from these targets. So the N.S.A. might focus initially on,
say, a British journalist working at Der Spiegel, collecting all of
her e-mail communications as well as all uploaded videos, photos,
Web surfing data, social media posts and then collect the same in-
formation about all of the contacts in the journalist’s address book
and then about all of the contacts in their address books.”
Mr. Jaffer argues that congress should have limited the NSA’s authority to
monitor the communications of innocent people.
12.1.3 Critical Mass
The virtualization of communication has led to an interesting phenomenon,
which is best explained with Schelling’s [128] ant colony example.
It is not believed that any ant in any ant colony knows how the
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ant colony works. Each ant has certain things that it does, in
coordinated association with other ants. But no single ant designed
the system and no individual ant knows whether there are too few or
too many ants exploring for food or rebuilding after a thunderstorm
or helping to carry in the carcass of a beetle. Each ant lives in its
immediate environment and responding to signals of which it does
not know the origin.([128], p. 21-22)
Why are millions of people joining the pool? It is well established that
individuals are increasingly influenced by the opinions of others. We’re more
likely to do things when we know our friends approve of. Schelling [128] calls
this critical mass.
You sometimes double park if it looks as though everyone else is
double parked, stay inline if everyone else is staying inline, but if
people surge toward the ticket window, you are alert to do the same.
What is common to all these situations is the way people’s behavior
depends on how many are behaving a particular way. ([128], p. 93)
To the individual engaging in virtual communication, the effect of build-
ing a relationship can be as meaningful as building one in the real life. Virtual
reality has psychological effects on people. In a different context, Adler and
Satari [7] examine the effectiveness of virtual reality simulations to the treat-
ment of phobias and anxiety disorders. Research shows that virtual reality can
be as powerful as traditional treatment methods, where patients suffering from
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fear of flying, fear of driving, acrophobia, social phobia, and eating disorders
showed long term improvements after treatment.
Wood and Smith [157] quote Ellen Ullman, who on an occasion, found
herself up one night and decided to send a text message to a colleague. After
reading her message, he wrote back to inquire why she was up so late. The
two exchanged cordial messages, but the next day at the office, Ullman was
unsure about how to approach him. They had been friendly with one another
on the Internet, yet in the office, she felt tension. Ullman questioned, “In what
way am I permitted to know him? And which set of us is the more real: the
sleepless ones online, or these bodies in the daylight?”
Ullman’s experience was before the social networks era. Today we are
moving towards a society where virtual personas are weighted higher than
anything else. I worked at a company that went through a merger. We had
a visitor Y from the new company for an all day meeting. During the lunch
break, Y talked about his co-workers and in particular, X. X was described
not by his professional expertise but how he didn’t fit in this world. “X is
the most weird guy you’ll ever meet.” Why? Apparently, X did not have cell
phone, never used IM, etc. The mocking went on for a while when someone
in the room suggested looking up X on Google. All eyes on the projector and
VOILA! X is on Facebook! “He is on Facebook, ah so he is not as weird as
everyone thought he was,” said Y.
“I am on Facebook, therefore I am.” I wonder what Rene Descartes
might have to say about this!
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12.1.4 The Fourth Revolution
Floridi [53] argues that we are in the middle of a fourth revolution, an infor-
mation revolution. There have been three scientific revolutions before this,
which have had great impact on changing our understanding of the external
world and ourselves.
Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) theory of the heliocentric cosmology
displaced the Earth and humanity from the center of the universe. Charles
Darwin (1809-1882) with his theory of evolution showed that all species of
life have evolved over time from common ancestors through natural selection,
therefore displacing humanity from the center of the biological kingdom. Sig-
mund Freud (1856-1939), acknowledged that the mind is also unconscious and
subject to the defense mechanism of repression. Thus we are not immobile, at
the center of the universe, we are not unnaturally separate and diverse from
the rest of the animal kingdom, and we are very far from being standalone
minds entirely transparent to ourselves.
The credit for the fourth revolution goes to Alan Turing (1912-1954).
Since 1950s, computers have had an influence on changing not only our in-
teractions with the world but also our self-understanding. Floridi argues that
we are no longer standalone entities, but rather interconnected informational
organisms that he calls inforgs, sharing with biological agents and engineered
artifacts a global environment ultimately made of information, called the in-
fosphere.
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12.2 Relationships and Trust in Communication
Joan Silk [149] argues that we cooperate because it contributes to a public
good.
. . . altruistic social preferences are a precondition for the kinds of
effective collaborative that humans are so good at. It makes it look
as if our joint endeavors are mutualistic stag hunts, when in fact we
are often in situations in which our own interests and the interests
of the group are imperfectly aligned. I don’t give to public radio
because my $50 contribution is necessary in order for me to listen
to it. I give to public radio because I feel that it is the right thing
to do because it contributes to a public good.
It is well established by anthropologists that by nature human beings
are communal. Tomasello and his colleagues [148] describe in what way hu-
mans are considered more intelligent than other animals. They ran an array
of cognitive tests to adult chimpanzees and orangutans (two of our closest
primate relatives) and to two years old human children. As it turned out, the
children were not more skillful overall. They performed about the same as the
apes on the tests that measured how well they understood the physical world of
space, quantities and causality. However, the children performed better only
on tests that measured social skills such as social learning, communicating,
and reading the intentions of others.
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Language plays an important role in building relationships. Pinker
[105] argues that relationships are defined by language. There are essentially
three human relationships across cultures, as proposed by anthropologist Alan
Fiske; dominance, communality, and reciprocity. Dominance is the type of
relationships with some sort of top down hierarchy. Communality is the type
of relationships that involve kinship and mutualism. Reciprocity is the type
of relationships that involve business like exchanges.
Behavior that is acceptable in one relationship type can be anomalous
in another. For example, there can be awkward moments in workplace when
an employee doesn’t know whether to address their supervisor as by their
first name or to invite them for a drink after work. Pinker says that this is
because of the ambiguity whether their relationship is governed by dominance
or communality.
Two kinds of communal relationships of friendship and sex give rise to
the anxiety of dating. Say Bob wants to invite Ann to his place after a date,
he uses indirect speech, “Would you like to come up and see my etchings?”
instead of a more direct one such as, “Would you like to come up and have
sex?” Pinker argues that an obvious indirect message merely provide individual
knowledge where as direct speech provides mutual knowledge and relationships
are maintained or nullified by mutual knowledge of the relationship types.
So when Bob says, “would you like to come up and see my etchings”
and Ann says “no,” then Ann knows that she turned down a sexual overture
and Bob knows that she turned down a sexual overture but does Ann know
that Bob knows? Ann could be thinking maybe Bob thinks that she is naive.
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Does Bob know that Ann knows that he knows? He could be thinking that
maybe Ann is thinking that he is dense. Since, there is no common knowledge,
they can maintain the friction of friendship.
Ferrazi [50] provides insight into how building relationships can help
individuals reach their full potential. He claims that the path to both personal
and professional success is through creating an inner circle of trusted people
that he calls “lifeline relationships.” These are relationships that can offer
you feedback, encouragement, and mutual support to help discover a more
successful individual in you.
Garfield [57] considers the element of relationship in digital marketing.
During the Vancouver Olympics in 2010, in order to promote their same old
antiperspirant/deodorant products, Secret started a movement with “Let Her
Jump.” They wanted to get women ski jumping into the Olympics. “We believe
in the equality of the genders and that all people should be able to pursue their
goals without fear.” It was extremely successful. The Let Her Jump video was
viewed more than 700,000 times. Among the viewers, 57 percent reported their
impression of the brand had improved and 85% reported the brand helped
them feel more confident. They also saw an increase in purchase intent for
women by 11% and teens by 33% from Facebook fans and 50% jump for those
who viewed the video. Secret sales increased by 8% despite cutting TV ad
spending by 70%.
What is interesting is that the product itself did not change; the com-
pany merely sent a new message and positioned itself in relation to millions
of women who could potentially announce their affection for the brand. Thus
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creating a cycle effect that improved Secret’s trust relationship with its con-
sumers.
Oxford dictionary [1] defines the word trust as,
Trust [noun] firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of some-
one or something; relations have to be built on trust; they have been
able to win the trust of the others.
• acceptance of the truth of a statement without evidence or
investigation: I used only primary sources, taking nothing on
trust
• the state of being responsible for someone or something: a
man in a position of trust
• [count noun] literary a person or duty for which one has re-
sponsibility: rulership is a trust from God
Trust is the foundation on which all relationships are built. Maintaining
trust helps sustain a relationship and violating it leads to friction, which is
difficult to repair. Trust starts among family members, expands to friends,
and others overtime. Trust is what allows us to have meaningful relationships
with one another, within and between all three relationship levels, dominance,
communality, and reciprocity. Trust is the glue that holds together social
groups such as families, friends, communities, organizations, companies, and
nations.
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Fukuyama [56] explains that for a country to grow economically, its
people must strive for something bigger than self-interest. Trust among indi-
viduals is what holds them together in a society and gives rise to middle or-
ganizations in between family and government. Fukuyama provides historical
references and categorizes China, Italy, France and Korea as low trust societies;
Japan, Germany and the United States as high trust societies. In low-trust
societies, individuals rely on the extended family to build commercial, social
and political networks. The trouble with the extended-family approach to
economic development is that all families will soon run out of bloodline man-
agerial, scientific, literary or artistic talent. Countries of High-trust societies
form volunteer and meritocratic organizations that expand in scope and effi-
ciency to reach optimum economies of scale. These commercial and non-profit
organizations, which are not dependent on family ties, create a network of
efficiencies that benefit commerce, media communication and social change.
Trust plays a crucial role in communication; without trust we cannot
converse without wondering if other is lying or not. Trust is when we believe
the other is telling the truth not based on their message but based on our
perception of their character. Trust is knowing the unknown, believing the
unseen, giving and receiving without a second thought. Trust means that we
can act while taking something for granted. Language helps build and maintain
trust and the level of trust in turn decides the integrity of messages. When
we trust someone, it means we have no doubt our my mind about his or her
integrity. This is when communication channel opens and private information
not only gets transmitted but also believed. I may not have the empirical
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observation that “the morning star” is the same as the “evening star” (and
we rarely do), but when it comes from a trusted source, we believe it.
Current models of information exchange that are based on game the-
ory are over idealized often limiting the context to two players and making
assumptions that are unrealistic in real life. We strongly believe that relation-
ships lie at the heart of communication and trust is the heuristic decision rule
that allows us to deal with complexities that would require unrealistic effort
if we had to decide rationally. It is the heuristic rule that helps us converse
with each other. When there is trust, people with opposing preferences can
have meaningful talk and share information, even if they don’t agree with each
other on every single issue. Where there is no trust, communication turns into
a transaction, everyone looking out for their own self-interest. This is where
deception lives.
12.3 Knowledge in Communication
Communication requires awareness of self knowledge and knowledge of others.
In Speech Acts, the choice of what to say depends on knowledge of what the
speaker knows about the hearer. For example, “I have a Porsche, would you
like a ride sometime?” The sentence on the surface acts as an offer while an ef-
fect maybe to impress someone. For it to have the intended effect, the speaker
has to know that material objects can impress the hearer. Grice’s Coopera-
tive Principle and its maxims requires awareness of knowledge. For example,
“Make your contribution as informative as is required but not more informa-
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tive than is required,” depends on an understanding of what the hearer knows
already and what information needs to be communicated. Knowledge states
directly affects information transmission in communication. It is this aware-
ness of self-knowledge and knowledge of others that enables us to converse
with each other in a meaningful way.
In standard theories of language use, the speaker’s main purpose is
issuing an utterance to get her addressee to recognize her intentions. The
question these theories addresses is how does the speaker design her utterances
to achieve their goal. The context is limited to communication between two
people. However, merely adding an audience to the conversation changes the
dynamics. If the speaker does not know that there is an audience, he can
continue with the conversation as normal. If the speaker knows an audience is
present, he may formulate and execute his utterances differently. Clark et al.
[130][27][28][26] argue that there are four attitudes a speaker may take towards
an overhearer; namely indifference, disclosure, concealment, and deception.
Say Ann is the speaker, Bob is the addressee, and Carl is an overhearer. If
Ann is indifferent to Carl understanding what she says to Bob, she can refer
to the subject of her conversation by name say “Derek” as she normally would
with Bob. But if Ann wants to be certain that Carl too can identify Derek,
then she may need to expand on or change that reference, “Derek Aitken from
Denver”. If Ann wants to conceal Derek’s identity from Carl, she might say,
“The man we talked about last night.” She may even want to disguise Derek’s
identity to make Carl think she is referring to someone else.
Our attempt in the foregoing was to provide real-world examples and
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point out the urgency of building formal models to study the dynamics of
information exchange in more complex settings such as that of information
exchange in the presence of an audience. Also, we have argued that notions
such as relationship, trust, and knowledge must be considered into building
an effective model of signaling.
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13 Signaling with an Audience
Grice’s work [63] which introduced game-theoretic ideas into reasoning about
communication greatly influenced the way philosophers, linguists, and cog-
nitive scientists think about meaning and communication. His work is a
foundation of the modern study of pragmatics drawing a clear distinction
between speaker meaning, linguistic meaning, and the interrelations between
these two phenomena. He examined how in an ordinary conversational sit-
uation a speaker, S, shapes his/her utterances to be understood by a hearer
H and how both S and H observe some central principles during the talk
exchange. His theory of meaning is one that is intention-based, defining lin-
guistic meaning in terms of speaker meaning, “S meant something by U” is
roughly equivalent to “S uttered U with the intention of inducing a belief in
H by means of the recognition of his intention”.
At the heart of Grice’s theory of meaning lie the Cooperative Principle
and its special maxims of conversation. The Cooperative Principle is a set of
norms expected in a conversation. It mainly consists of four maxims. The
Quantity maxim requires that a speaker is as informative as required. It
relates to the quantity of information to be provided. The Quality maxim
requires a speaker to tell the truth provable by adequate evidence. The Manner
maxim requires the speaker to avoid ambiguity or obscurity, be direct and
straightforward. Finally the Relation maxim requires a speaker’s response to
be relevant to topic of discussion.
A good question to ask is, why do people observe the Cooperative
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Principle?
Grice assumes that people have learned to do so in childhood. Lewis
[83] explains it in terms of social conventions. The work of Lewis emphasizes
the existence of social conventions at the heart of which lie language and co-
operative problem solving.
For example, the sexton of the Old North Church and Paul Revere must
coordinate to warn the countryside of an assault by British army. The sexton
knows whether the redcoats are staying home, coming by land, or coming by
sea. By placing either zero, one, or two lanterns in the belfry, he signals Paul
Revere whether to go home, warn people that redcoats are coming by land, or
warn people that the redcoats are coming by sea.
A signaling problem in this sense is a coordination problem, because
communicator and his audience must coordinate so that the communicator’s
signal results in the mutually desired action. Both Grice and Lewis empha-
size that participants’ interests must be aligned with a common goal and the
existence of some sort of mutual understanding in a talk exchange.
But, not all communication is confined to people whose interests are
identical. Communication takes place between buyer and seller, or between
a suitor and a person of interest, or even between two politicians from na-
tions with opposite interests. Such semi-adversarial communication has been
studied by economists and even by philosophers and linguists.
We have argued that the current models of signaling are over-simplified
and lack the machinery to explain real-world dynamics of information ex-
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change. In particular, a two-player signaling game fails to apply to the prob-
lem we have identified that with the emergence of virtual communication we
constantly share information in the presence of an audience. Moreover, every-
day communication is often automatic and based on our perception of others
and heuristic rules we develop over time for sharing information. An effec-
tive model of signaling games must account for knowledge, relationships, and
ethics in communication.
We extend the ideas of Grice on cooperative communication and the
ideas of Crawford, Farrell, Rabin, Sobel, and Stalnakar on communication
with partially overlapping interests. In our model, we introduce a third player
in the two-player signaling game. The audience may or may not have a move
in the game. However, it is clear that the existence of an audience may affect
the sender’s signal and/or receiver’s action depending on the dynamics of the
game. Needless to say, the audience may benefit from observing the signal even
if he does not make a move in the game. Additionally, we allow for the players
to act based on their mental models of how they perceive their relationships
with the other players dropping some of the common knowledge assumptions
along the way. We distinguish between surface and net utilities to account for
the results from empirical studies.
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13.1 Abstract Framework
13.1.1 Quantifying Relationships and Trust
We have argued that relationship and trust among individuals play an impor-
tant role in communication; without trust we cannot converse without won-
dering whether the other is telling the truth. As we start trusting individuals,
we form meaningful relationships; the closer a relationship the more freely we
can share information.
One way to formalize these notions is to consider how closely a player
perceives himself in relation to the other players. This is a subjective measure
i.e. a player perceiving himself close to another player does not necessary mean
that it be mutual. We can think of it as players’ mental models 8, a diagram
of some sort, that gets updated based on experience.
Table 1: Example of mental models for the players S and R.
MS MR
S
R
A
1
10 R
S
A
1
∞
A Weighted Directed Graph can be used to represents players’ mental
models. Each player has his/her own mental model9 in which they have an
edge going to other players. The number on the edge is a measure of perceived
8Some background material on the theory can be found in Appendix B.
9We do not necessarily intend the mental model to be in the head of the agent. We could
think of it as part of our representation of the agent.
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closeness (or distance) with or trust in another player. A smaller distance
means the player perceives himself closely related to the other player. A larger
distance means the player doesn’t perceive himself closely related to the other
player.
Players form their mental models overtime based on their experiences
with other players. A naive or trusting player can start off assigning relatively
smaller distances on the edges going to other players and as betrayed increment
the distances. A calculating player can start off not trusting other players and
assign larger distances to edges going to other players but as he starts trusting
decrement the distances. Players can form levels of mental models i.e. not only
a mental model of one’s relationship with others but also a model of others’
mental models.
On September 6, 2012, Sen. John Kerry talks about Mitt Romney’s
stance on political issues at the DNC [151].
It isn’t fair to say Mitt Romney doesn’t have a position on Afghanistan.
He has EVERY position! He, he was against setting a date for with-
drawal, then he said it was right, and then he left the impression
that maybe it was wrong to leave that soon. He said, it was tragic
to leave Iraq and then he said it was fine. He said we should’ve
intervened Libya sooner then he ran down the hallway to run away
from the reporters who were asking questions. Then he said, the
intervention was too aggressive and then he said, the world was a
better place because the intervention succeeded; talk about being
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for it before you were against it. Mr. Romney, Mr. Romney, Mr.
Romney, here is a little advice.. before you debate Barack Obama
on Foreign policy you better finish the debate with yourself.
Sen. Kerry is speaking to the Democratic group of voters (receiver)
but he is aware that his speech is airing on TV and the Republican group of
voters (audience) is watching. He is taking advantage of the common ground
he shares with the receiver (i.e. they belong to the same group and thus
they have mutual knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions) and not telling the
receiver anything new. However, his signal is directed to the audience. He
may get cheers and applause from the receiver but the effect of his signal on
the audience is more lucrative as it can turn into a potential vote for Obama.
Sen. Kerry is sending a signal to the audience about Mitt Romney, attacking
Mitt Romney’s character accusing him of dishonesty. Why is this so important
to his speech? Well, if someone is not trusted with their words, how can they
be trusted with decisions concerning a nation. What Sen. Kerry is attempting
to do with his signal is to challenge trust that the Republican group (audience)
may have in Mitt Romney.
For simplicity, we assume one level of mental models and require play-
ers to only consider their subjective measure in the calculation of utilities.
Although, in real-world communication, we not only account for those we are
directly relate to but also their relationships to people who may be strangers
to us. Suppose two friends Ann and Beth are meeting for dinner. The two are
extremely close and can talk and laugh for hours. Usually they share every-
thing with each other. Ann arrives at the restaurant and finds Beth and her
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mother who has decided to join them for dinner. They spend a good half an
hour talking about the menu then food. But there won’t be any talk about
boys. In this case, Beth’s mother is an audience to Ann and Beth’s conversa-
tion. Ann is close to Beth but not Beth’s mother. Technically, there is an edge
from Ann to Beth with a small distance but the sum of distances on the edges
from Ann to Beth and from Beth to Beth’s mother has a larger distance. In
this case, Ann has to think twice before sharing any private information.
While relationships are individualistic, notions such as fairness, ethics,
etc are social and also play a role in communication.
13.1.2 Surface vs. Net Utilities
We distinguish between two types of utilities; surface and net utilities. Play-
ers’ surface utilities are given in the game. Net utilities are subjective and
calculated by adjusting surface utilities based on factors important to each
player. The resulting game is a transformation of the original game, which
may or may not be common knowledge among players.
The idea of discounting utilities based on social distance has been em-
pirically examined by Jones and Rachlin [113]. Their results showed that the
amount of money a person was willing to forgo in order to give a sum of money
to another person decreased as a hyperbolic function of the perceived social
distance between them.
Consider the ultimatum game where Ann is given $10 to divide between
her and Bob. She divides it into ui for herself and uj for Bob where ui+uj = 10.
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Here Ann is player i and Bob is player j. If Bob agrees to her division then
that is what they both get. If not, neither gets anything. We will discuss how
the game is played differently based on net utilities.
The extensive form representation of this game is given in Figure 15.
b
HHHHHH
Ann
L Rr
 
 
 
@
@
@
Bob
A Dr
5, 5
r
0, 0
r
 
 
 
@
@
@
Bob
A Dr
9, 1
r
0, 0
Figure 15: Extensive form representation of an ultimatum game where Ann either
offers a fair (L) or unfair (R) proposal and Bob can accept (A) or reject (D).
Under a strictly utilitarian view, if Ann is rational, then doing backward
induction, she should give Bob the lowest possible amount and keep the rest
for herself. In the example above, Ann may split the ten dollar bill giving
Bob a dollar and keeping nine dollars for herself. If Bob is rational, he would
accept the dollar as it is better than nothing. There are experimental studies
that show that Bob would reject such an unfair allocation. For example,
Roth et al. [122] run an experiment comparing related two-person bargaining
and multi person market environments in Israel, Japan, US, and Yugoslavia,
market outcomes converged to equilibrium everywhere, and there were no
payoff-relevant differences among countries. However, bargaining outcomes
were everywhere different from the equilibrium predictions and substantial
differences were observed among countries due to cultural differences.
Let ui and uj be the surface utilities for player i and j, and ∆ij be a
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measure of relationship between i and j as perceived by player i 10; we can
define player j’s contribution to player i’s utility as,
uj
k×∆ij where k > 0 is a
constant measuring the degree of social discounting or how much one cares
about relationships in general; a larger k would describe more selfish or less
altruistic choices. For simplification, we’ll drop the constant k and assume
that it is reflected in the value of ∆ij. The resulting function g(j, i) =
uj
∆ij
is
player j’s utility from player i’s perspective.
Secondly, we define the fairness correction as c ×|ui − uj| where c > 0 is
a constant measuring how much the player values social norms; here a larger
c would mean the player cares more about fairness. While relationship is
subjective and depends on individuals, fairness is social and varies by culture.
In other words, the amount of fairness created by ui and uj depends on the
social norms surrounding fairness. In our definition, we have assumed that the
society accepts an even allocation.
Let ui and uj be the surface utilities for player i and j, g(j, i) be the
net utility to player j from player i’s perspective i.e. contribution to the other
player, and h(i, j) be the social measure for fairness 11. We define player i’s
net utility as
f(i, j) = ui + g(j, i)− h(i, j)
In the ultimatum game above, Ann and Bob have utilities from L and
R. Ann’s net utility from choosing L is
10∆ij need not be the same as ∆ji but typically we expect them to be the same or close.
If i dislikes j then ∆ij could as well be negative but we will not look into this case.
11The payoff to j occurs as a benefit to i and lack of fairness occurs as loss.
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uLAnn +
uLBob
∆AnnBob
− (c× |uLAnn − uLBob|)
Say ∆AnnBob = 1, that is Ann perceives her relationship with Bob to
be close. Since the allocation is even, the fairness term will be zero.
Ann’s net utility is 5 + 5
1
− (c× |5− 5|) = 10. So Ann’s net utility is 10
instead of face value utility of 5.
Similarly, Ann’s net utility from choosing R is
uRAnn +
uRBob
∆AnnBob
− (c× |uRAnn − uRBob|)
Ann’s net utility is 9 + 1
1
− (c× |9− 1|). If Ann is not ethical (say c =
0) then her net utility is 10. However, if she is even a little ethical (say c=1
2
)
then her net utility is 9 + 1− 8
2
= 8. Thus Ann is better off choosing L.
Bob does not choose the allocation but has the option to accept or
reject Ann’s proposal. Let’s say Ann has proposed the allocation (9, 1). Let
∆BobAnn = 1 so Bob perceives himself closely related to Ann. Now if Bob puts
high value on fairness (say c = 2) then his net utility is
uRBob +
uRAnn
∆BobAnn
− (c× |uRBob − uRAnn|)
Bob’s net utility is 1 + 9
1
− (2× |1− 9|) = 1 + 9− 16 = −6. In this case
Bob will reject.
13.1.3 Knowledge, Relationships, and Ethics in Signaling Games
In a signaling game, players may not only be interested in the objective reality
but also in each others’ knowledge. Players can have knowledge of state of the
world and each other’s knowledge in various ways; the presence of an audience
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in turn can be a fact that can lead to different states of knowledge.
• Audience is eavesdropping and neither the sender nor the receiver knows
about his presence
• Audience’s presence is known to the sender only
• Audience’s presence is known to the receiver only
• Audience’s presence is known to both the sender and the receiver
• Audience’s presence is common knowledge among the sender, the re-
ceiver, and the audience
Common knowledge is the highest possible level of knowledge and there
could be all kinds of other complex cases depending on levels of knowledge.
Let p be a proposition that says, “Carl is eavesdropping.” Both the
sender and the receiver may know that p is true but neither may know if the
other knows or the fact that p is true can be common knowledge between the
sender and the receiver but not the audience. Sender’s private information can
be represented by another proposition. Let q be a proposition, “It is raining
now.” Perhaps the sender happens to just come from outside and knows that q
is true but the receiver who is indoors doesn’t have access to this information.
Other factors such as those of credibility can also be described in this manner.
Let r be a proposition, “The sender never lies.” Then if the sender sends a
signal to the receiver informing her that q is true and the receiver knows that
r is true, she may decide to take an umbrella when she steps out. It is clear
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that there could be complicated knowledge states among players. Formalisms
that support such representation and reasoning are called logics of knowledge
or epistemic logics12.
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Figure 16: Extensive representation of a two-player signaling game between Ann
(A) and Bob (B). Nature chooses Ann’s true ability H or L. Ann knows her ability
but not Bob. Ann sends one of two messages, “High” or “Low” to signal her ability
H or L to Bob who decides whether to hire Ann for the demanding (D) job or the
undemanding (U) job.
Suppose Ann is a job applicant and Bob a potential employer who
wants to hire Ann for one of two positions; demanding and undemanding.
Bob will give Ann the demanding job if he believes Ann’s ability is high and
the undemanding job if he believes Ann’s ability is low. Ann knows her ability
but Bob does not. Ann has a choice to send message “High” or “Low” to signal
her ability to Bob, who then decides to hire Ann for either the demanding job
or the undemanding job. Ann’s true ability and Bob’s action determine the
payoffs for both players. The extensive representation of the game is shown in
Figure 16.
Let p be the proposition, “Ann’s ability is low.” We will assume that it is
common knowledge between Ann and Bob that Ann knows whether p i.e.
CKA,B(KA(p)∨KA(¬p)). In other words, two world connected by an A arrow
will never differ in the truth value of p. Also, each player i’s action follows
12Some background material about epistemic logic is in appendix A.
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from formulas beginning with Ki. So for Ann, all formulas starting with KA.
Case 1: Consider the structure of possible worlds shown in Figure 17.
At w the following are true:
(1) p
(2) KA(p)
(3) KB(p)
(4) CKA,B(p)
w
p
Figure 17: The content of the world w is {p} which is common knowledge between
Ann and Bob.
In this case, Ann’s ability is low and this fact is common knowledge
between Ann and Bob. Since Bob knows Ann’s true ability, he will choose
undemanding regardless of Ann’s message. Therefore, Ann might as well send
a truthful message “Low.” Ann and Bob’s payoffs are 1 and 2 respectively.
Case 2: Consider the structure of possible worlds shown in Figure 18.
At w1, the following are true:
(1) ¬p
(2) KA(¬p)
(2) ¬KB(¬p)
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w1
¬p
w2
p
B
Figure 18: B is Bob’s accessibility relation. The content of the worlds w1 and w2
are {¬p} and {p} respectively.
Say w1 is the true state of the world. Then it is not the case that Ann’s
ability is low. Since Ann’s ability is high, she has no incentive to lie so she will
send the message “High” to signal her true ability. Bob does not know Ann’s
ability. If Bob is trusting, he may believe Ann’s message and hire her for the
demanding job. In which case, Ann receives a payoff of 2 and Bob a payoff of
1.
Figure 19 is a modification of the game shown in Figure 16. As before,
nature chooses Ann’s ability. Ann can send a message “High” or “Low” to
signal her ability to Bob. Bob chooses whether to hire Ann for the demanding
job, undemanding job, or not hire her. Ann’s true ability together with Bob’s
action decides the payoff for both players.
Let’s examine how players’ knowledge states may alter the outcome of
this game.
Case 3: Consider the structure of possible worlds shown in Figure 20.
At w2, the following are true.
(1) p
(2) KA(p)
(3) ¬KB(p)
111
b
PPPPPPPPP
A
H Lr
HHHHHH
B
D
N
Ur
2, 1
r
0, 0
r
0, 0
r
HHHHHH
B
D
N
Ur
2, 0
r
0, 0
r
1, 2
Figure 19: Extensive representation of a two-player signaling game between Ann
(A) and Bob (B). Nature chooses Ann’s ability. Ann can send one of two messages,
“High” or “Low” to signal her ability H or L to Bob, who decides whether to give
Ann the demanding (D) job, give Ann the undemanding (U) job, or not hire (N)
her. Ann has an incentive to lie.
(4) KA(¬KB(p))
w1
¬p
w2
p
B
Figure 20: B is Bob’s accessibility relation. The content of the worlds w1 and w2
are {¬p} and {p} respectively.
Say w2 is the true state of the world. Ann’s ability is low. Ann knows
that her ability is low. Ann also knows that Bob does not know her true
ability. Will Ann lie to Bob? Ann can get a higher payoff by sending a
dishonest message “High” signaling to Bob that her ability is high. If Bob
is trusting and believes Ann’s message, he will choose demanding; Ann will
receive a payoff of 2 and Bob a payoff of zero. She may lie and get away with
it.
Case 4: Consider the structure of possible worlds shown in Figure 21.
At w1, the following are true:
(1) p
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(2) KA(p)
(3) KB(p)
(4) ¬KAKB(p)
In fact, Bob knows (1) through (4). Also Ann may consider it possible
that Bob knows p.
w1
p
w2
p
w3
¬p
A
B
Figure 21: A and B are Ann and Bob’s accessibility relations. The contents of the
worlds w1, w2, and w3 are {p}, {p}, and {¬p} respectively.
Say w1 is the true state of the world. Ann’s ability is low. Ann knows
her ability is low. Bob know Ann’s true ability. Ann does not know that Bob
knows that her ability is low. Ann may send the message “High” since she
can get a higher payoff if Bob acts based on her message. Bob may hire Ann
for the undemanding job. In which case, Ann receives a payoff of 1 and Bob a
payoff of 2. However, if Bob is annoyed by the fact that Ann lied to him, he
may decide not to hit Ann. In which case, Ann and Bob receive a payoff of
zero each.
Case 5: Consider the structure of possible worlds shown in Figure 22.
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At w1, the following are true:
(1) p
(2) KA(p)
(3) KB(p)
(4) KAKB(p)
(5) KA(¬KBKAKB(p))
w3
p
w1
p
w2
p
w4
p
w5
p
w6
¬p
B A
B
B
B
A
B
Figure 22: A and B are Ann and Bob’s accessibility relations. The content of the
worlds w1, w2, w3, w4, w5 and w6 are {p}, {p}, {p}, {p}, {p}, and {¬p} respectively.
Ann may send an honest message based on (1) to (4) i.e. (5) is not
required. However, it may be the case that Ann may take advantage of the
fact that Bob doesn’t know whether Ann knows that Bob knows that Ann’s
ability is low. Therefore, Ann may send an honest message to impress Bob
with her honesty.
Suppose Carl is an audience to Ann and Bob’s conversation. Assume
Carl knows Ann’s true ability. The game proceeds as before, except there is a
potential move by Carl who may choose to reveal or withhold information to
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Bob about Ann’s ability. Ann’s ability together with Carl and Bob’s actions
determine the payoff for all three players.
Let p be the proposition, “Ann’s ability is low” and q the proposition,
‘‘Carl is present.” We are interested in the case where Ann’s ability is low i.e.
p is true and Ann is greedy. In other words, Ann prefers a highly paying job
over a lower paying job and a lower paying job over not being hired regardless
of her ability.
Case 6: Let’s consider the structure of possible worlds shown in Figure 23 13.
w1
¬p
w2
p
A,C
A,C
B
Figure 23: A, B, and C are Ann, Bob, and Carl’s accessibility relations. The
content of the worlds w1 and w2 are {¬p} and {p} respectively.
At w2, the following are true:
13We are putting self loops at w1 and w2 to indicate that Bob is the only one who doesn’t
have knowledge of the full situation.
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(1) p
(2) ¬KB(p)
(3) CKA,B,C(q)
(4) CKA,C(p ∧ ¬KB(p))
There are three outcomes that are of interest to us:
(O1) Ann tells the truth by sending the message “Low” and Bob hires
Ann for the undemanding job
(O2) Ann lies by sending the message “High,” Carl doesn’t reveal Ann’s
true ability, and Bob hires Ann for the demanding job
(O3) Ann lies by sending the message “High,” Carl reveals Ann’s true
ability, and Bob does not hire Ann
Ann prefers O2 to O1 to O3. However, Ann’s choice is only between
saying “High” or saying “Low.” If she says “High” then what happens next
depends on what Carl does. Ann’s own action will depend on what she an-
ticipates Carl will do. Carl can either reveal the value of p to Bob or not 14.
Also, whether Carl would reveal Ann’s true ability to Bob depends on whether
Carl values his relationship with Ann over ethics or vice versa. If Carl cares
about his relationship with Ann more than what he believes is the right thing
to do, he may keep quiet and let Bob hire Ann for the demanding job. If Carl
is ethical and this fact takes precedence over his relationship to Ann, Carl will
reveal Ann’s true ability to Bob. In which case, Bob would not hire Ann.
14Since Bob doesn’t know Ann but have worked with Carl, we assume he will take Carl’s
words over Ann.
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Thus, if Ann’s relationship to Carl is close then doing backward in-
duction on Bob and Carl’s moves, she will say “High.” If Ann perceives her
relationship to Carl to be distant, then she cannot hope for outcome O2 and
must choose between O1 and O3. Since her payoff in O1 is higher, she decides
to tell the truth. Table 2 shows the payoff for these different cases.
Ann Bob Carl
1 2 0
2 0 (a) 0 or (b) -1
0 0 (a) -5 or (b) 1
Table 2: Ann, Bob, and Carl’s payoffs from outcomes O1, O2, and O3.
If the outcome is O1, then Ann and Bob’s payoffs are 1 and 2 respec-
tively. Carl has a payoff of zero as he has no moves. If the outcome is O2,
then Ann’s payoff is 2 and Bob’s payoff is 0. Carl’s payoff is either zero if he
is close to Ann or -1 if he is not. If the outcome is O3 then Ann receives a
payoff of zero and Bob a payoff of 0. Carl’s payoff is -5 if he is close to Ann
or 1 if he is distant.
In the example above, the audience may have an explicit move where
he can reveal the sender’s type to the receiver. Let’s look at another example
where the audience’s presence alone may change the strategy the sender plays
even though the audience has no move in the game.
Suppose Bob, an automobile salesman, is selling a used car to a cus-
tomer Carl. Bob knows that the car is unreliable but Carl does not. Bob
wants to earn a commission by selling the car and Carl wants to get the best
deal. Nature chooses the type of car which is either reliable or unreliable, Bob
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sends a message “Reliable” or “Unreliable,” Carl chooses to buy or not buy
the car. Nature’s move together with Carl’s action decided the payoff for both
Bob and Carl. The payoff matrix is shown in Figure 24.
Bob
Carl
B N
R 1, 1 0, 0
U 1,−1 0, 0
Figure 24: Normal form representation of the game where nature decided car type
which is either reliable (R) or unreliable(U). Bob sends a message “Reliable” or
“Unreliable” to Carl who decided whether to buy (B) or not buy (N) the car.
Let r be the proposition, “The car is reliable.”
Case 7: Consider the structure of possible worlds shown in Figure 25.
At w1, the following are true:
(1) ¬p
(2) KB(¬p)
(2) ¬KC(¬p)
w1
¬p
w2
p
A,C
Figure 25: A and C are Ann and Carl’s accessibility relation. The content of the
worlds w1 and w2 are {¬p} and {p} respectively.
Say w1 is the true state of the world. Then it is not the case that the
car is reliable. Bob knows that the car is unreliable but Carl does not. Since
Bob could get a higher payoff by selling an unreliable car to Carl, he may lie
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to Carl and send the message “Reliable” to potentially induce a belief in Carl
that the car is reliable. If Carl is trusting, he will buy the car. In which case,
Bob receives a payoff of 1 and Carl a payoff of -1.
Suppose Ann, who is Bob’s mother, is an audience in the game. Ann
disapproves of Bob cheating and Bob knows this.
Case 8: Consider the structure of possible worlds shown in Figure 25.
Say w1 is the true state of the world. Will Bob send the message
“Reliable” or “Unreliable” to Carl? Both Ann and Carl don’t know whether
the car is reliable or not. Bob wants to earn his commission and he may reason,
“What my mother doesn’t know won’t hurt her.” Bob may send the deceitful
message “Reliable” to Carl. If Carl is trusting and believes Bob’s message, he
may decide to buy the car.
Case 9: Consider the same structure of the possible worlds as shown in Figure
26.
At w1, the following are true:
(1) ¬p
(2) KB(¬p)
(3) KA(¬p)
(4) ¬KC(¬p)
The car is unreliable. Both Ann and Bob know that the car is unreliable
but Carl does not. What message will Bob send to Carl? If Bob is close to
his mother and cares about her feelings, he may accept monetary loss in order
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w1
¬p
w2
p
C
Figure 26: C is Carl’s accessibility relations. The content of the worlds w1 and
w2 are {¬p} and {p} respectively.
to please Ann. He may send a honest message “Unreliable.” If on the other
hand, he doesn’t care about his mother’s disapproval, he may send the message
“Reliable.”
For cases 9 through 11, consider the structure of possible worlds shown
in Figure 26 and say w1 is the true state of the world.
Case 9: Assume Ann likes her son to make a commission more than what she
thinks is the right thing to do and Bob knows this. What message will Bob
send to Carl? He may play his strategy as in the case where his mother was
not present. That is try to deceive Carl into buying an unreliable car.
Case 10: Assume Bob and Carl are close friends. What message will Bob
send to Carl? Here Ann’s presence and whether she knows that the car is
reliable or not doesn’t come into the picture. Bob may consider his friend’s
loss and adjust his strategy accordingly.
Case 11: Consider the following situation. Dan, who is Bob’s boss, is a
second audience to Bob and Carl’s conversation. Here Bob’s strategy not only
depends on his relationship with his mother but also his relationship with
his boss. Sending the message “Unreliable” would please Ann while sending
the message “Reliable” would please Dan. What message would Bob send to
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Carl? He may choose to send a message such as, “the car has been recently
painted15,” leaving Carl to calculate whether the car is mechanically good.
Saying something that is positive but not strong enough would not create as
much anger in the boss and would not hurt his mother’s feelings.
We have shown through a series of examples that three important fac-
tors lead to sender playing a different strategy from what he would normally
play in the game; players’ knowledge states, relationships, and trust. In all
these cases, the original payoff matrix is transformed taking into consideration
such factors.
13.2 Formal Model
A signaling game with an audience is a communication game between the
sender S and the receiver R in the presence of an audience A. The game
is characterized by a set of players P , a set of payoff matrices M, a set of
worlds W , a set of signals F , a set of actions A, a set of mental models R, a
semantic interpretation function ;s, a pragmatic interpretation function ;p,
and utility functions µ¯S and µ¯R. We assume all sets P , M, W , F , R, and A
are finite.
The game proceeds as follows.
1. Nature chooses w ∈ W
15This is analogous to Grice’s example where a professor writing a letter of recommenda-
tion says that the candidate has excellent handwriting without saying anything more and
leaving the recipient to conclude that the candidate is weak.
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2. S observes w but R does not 16
3. S sends a signal f ∈ F to R
4. R chooses an action a ∈ A based on the S’s signal f
5. The actual world w and receiver’s action a determine the payoff for both
players
6. All of the above takes place in the presence of an audience A
P = {S,R,A} is the set of players. Both S and R are active players
in the sense that they have an explicit move in the game. The audience has
no move in the game but his presence may affect the sender’s signal and/or
the receiver’s action. The structure of the game is common knowledge among
players.
The semantic interpretation function ;s ∈ F 7→ φ ⊆ W maps signals
to sets of worlds and a signal f1 ;s {w1} says that the conventional meaning
of f1 is {w1}. It is also possible to have a signal f12 ;s {w1, w2} where
the meaning of f12 is {w1, w2}. Signals’ conventional meaning is common
knowledge among players if they share a common language. Signals do not
necessarily have an associated cost 17. The pragmatic interpretation function
;p ∈ F 7→ ϕ ⊆ W also maps signals to sets of worlds but unlike the semantic
interpretation function;s, the pragmatic interpretation function;p may not
16It is possible for A to partially observe w.
17Michael Franke had a good remark that if the audience’s presence affects whether the
sender tells the truth or not (as in the automobile salesman example) then lying may affect
the sender’s net utility and is therefore costly.
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be common knowledge18. It could very well be that f1 ;s {w1} and the
pragmatic interpretation the receiver chooses is f1 ;p {w1, w2}. In the case
where the receiver is close to the sender and fully trusts her, the literal and
pragmatic meaning of the receiver will choose may coincide i.e. f1 ;s {w1}
and f1 ;p {w1}. In such cases, we can say the sender’s signal is believed and
the receiver may act based on the sender’s signal.
In addition to introducing an audience into the two-player signaling
games, we are also adding a new concept which is that of mental models.
Mental model theory was developed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne [75][74]. The
theory explains reasoning in terms of models of possibilities where each mental
model represents what is common to a possibility. A mental model is a kind
of internal representation of external reality that people use for cognition,
reasoning, and decision-making1920.
Let R be the set of mental models representing players’ perceived re-
lationships with each other. We formally represent a mental model r ∈ R as
a weighted directed graph G(V , E ,D,L) where V denotes the set of vertices, E
= {< i, j > |i, j ∈ V} denotes the edge set and < i, j > is an ordered pair of
vertices, D = {∆i,j ∈ N|i, j ∈ V∧ < i, j >∈ E} denotes the set of distances on
edges, and L : E 7→ D is a mapping function which assigns distances to edges.
The function L closely relates to players’ perceived relationships. A
18While the sender knows how his signal will be literally interpreted, he does not know
the pragmatic interpretation the receiver will choose. However, it is possible for the sender
to have guesses.
19Some background material can be found in Appendix B.
20Our notion of mental models may not be exactly the same as theirs but nonetheless
there are similarities.
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smaller ∆i,j would means that player i perceives his relationship to player j to
be close and a larger ∆i,j would mean that player i perceives her relationship
to player j to be distant. A naive or altruistic player may start off assigning
smaller distances on edges going to other players and increment it as betrayed.
A calculating or selfish player may start off assigning larger values on edges go-
ing to other players and decrement it as he starts to form closer relationships.
Relationships are not necessarily symmetric i.e. ∆i,j need not be the same as
∆j,i for i, j ∈ P . It may be possible to have multiple levels of mental models
where players not only have a model of their perceived relationships to the
other players but also have a model of other players’ perceived relationships,
etc. Since our players have limited processing capabilities, we limit the level
of mental models to at most two. Players can act based on their perception
of how they relate to other players but may also consider other players’ per-
ceived relationships. For simplicity, we assume direct relationships where each
player consider one level of depth in the graph starting from their own vertex.
Although, technically indirect relationships, such as S relates to A through R,
can be accounted for by a graph traversal and aggregation of distances on the
edges.
Definition 1 Let µ¯i ∈ M × W × A 7→ R be the surface utility for player
i ∈ P . Given the surface utility µ¯j for players j, a measure of relationship
∆i,j between i and j as perceived by player i, we define player j’s utility from
player i’s perspective as
β(j, i) =
µ¯j
∆i,j
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Definition 2 Given surface utilities µ¯i, µ¯j, and µ¯k for i, j, k ∈ P , ∆i,j, and
∆i,k, we define player i’s net utility
21 as
µi = µ¯i + β(j, i) + β(k, i)
It is not necessary for the audience to have a surface utility in the
game. However, the audience has a net utility in the game which is calculated
by adding β(S,A) and β(R,A).
The space of pure sender strategies S =W 7→ F is the set of functions
from worlds to signals. The space of pure receiver strategies R = F 7→ A is
the set of functions from signals to actions.
M contains one ore more matrices. The game matrix mCK ∈ M is
the surface matrix that is common knowledge between players. In addition to
mCK , there may be two transformed matrices mS ∈ M and mR ∈ M from
the sender and the receiver’s perspectives. These matrices are the result of S
and R correcting their surface utilities in mCK taking into consideration their
first-level mental models of how they perceive to be related to other players.
It is not necessary for mS and mR to be common knowledge. In mCK , mS,
and mR the rows are worlds and the columns are actions.
Since the receiver doesn’t know the actual world w and his strategy
is from signals to actions, a conversation needs to happen where the receiver
is converting his transformed matrix mR to m
σ
R where rows are signals and
columns are actions. In other words, the receiver has to map the sender’s
21We can consider social norms into the calculation of net utilities but we leave it out of
the definition as it greatly varies by culture.
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signals to sets of worlds and calculate his payoff.
Suppose mCK has three rows w1, w2, and w3 and the sender sends f1
if the world is w1, f2 if the world is w2 and f3 if the world is w3. The receiver
uses f1 ;s {w1}, f2 ;s {w2}, and f3 ;s {w3} to convert his transformed
matrix mσR. In this case, the new matrix has the same number of rows as mCK
where w1, w2, and w3 are replaced by f1, f2, and f3 respectively. Of course,
there are more complicated cases such as one where given three rows in mCK ,
the sender is using two signals f1 ;s {w1} and f12 ;s {w1, w2}. Thus, the
receiver’s transformed matrix mσR will have two rows instead of three i.e. f1
and f23. For the signal f23, the receiver has to calculate his utility from w2 and
w3 in mR. If utilities are cardinal and worlds w2 and w3 are equally likely then
the receiver may use Stalnakar’s approach of taking an average of his utilities.
The receiver may take the minimum of the payoffs from w1 and w2 if he is
using Maximin or he may use some other strategy.
The sender doesn’t necessarily know mσR but he can have guesses m
σ1
SR
. . . mσkSR which are matrices from the receiver’s perspective as imagined by the
sender. Thus the effective mental model of the sender for the receiver will be
one or more matrices whose rows are signals and columns are actions. The
receiver’s actual matrix mσR may be among these which the sender considers
possible. To fix thought we assume k = 1. You can think of it as a theory of
mind that the sender ascribes to the receiver to explain the receiver’s behavior
and predict his action. It is important to note that the sender’s signal is based
on how she thinks the receiver will interpret her signal and what the receiver
will do if her signal is interpreted in a certain way. She may ask, “What is
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the receiver thinking and how will my signal be interpreted?” The issue of how
the signal is actually interpreted by the receiver does not arise at the time the
sender is contemplating of sending her signal. Once the sender sends a signal,
it is up to the receiver to decide which action to choose.
Let us now define players’ best strategies given this apparatus.
Definition 3: Let r∗ ∈ R be a receiver strategy and mσR be the receiver’s
transformed matrix where rows are signals and columns are actions. Then r∗
is a best response of the receiver to a strategy s ∈ S of the sender if and only
if r∗ ∈ BRR(s) where
BRR(s) = arg max
r∈R
[µσR(m
σ
R, s, r)]
Definition 4: Let w ∈ W be the actual world, s∗ ∈ S be a sender strategy,
mS be the sender’s transformed matrix, and m
σ
RS be the receiver’s transformed
matrix as imagined by the sender. Then s∗ is a best strategy by the sender if
and only if s∗ ∈ BSS(w) where
BSS(w) = arg max
s∈S
[
µS(mS, w, arg max
r∈R
[µσR(m
σ
RS, s, r)])
]
One could extend the above definition to one where the sender imagines
more than one matrices from the receiver’s perspective. The sender has a belief
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that when she sends a signal f ∈ F , the receiver will take an action a ∈ A
which will give her a payoff from mS. Since she knows the actual world, she
will choose that signal f which would give her the “best” payoff given the
receiver’s strategy. The payoff that the sender gets from mS depends on what
she thinks the receiver will do once she sends a signal f ∈ F . Say the sender
has two possible signals f1 and f2 for w1 and w2 respectively, and she imagines
two matrices m1SR and m
2
SR from the receiver’s perspective. Then for each of
her two strategies i.e. sending signal f1 or sending signal f2, she considers how
the receiver will act in m1SR and m
2
SR. Suppose the outcomes from sending the
signal f1 are x and y and the outcomes from sending the signal f2 are x
′ and
y′ from m1SR and m
2
SR respectively. Then the sender has two sets of possible
payoffs for each of her signals f1 and f2. The sender is uncertain about which
matrix the receiver is using. The sender may compare these two sets of payoffs
and pick that signal which is “best” for her given the receiver’s strategy. The
sender may use Minimax, Maximin, or some other strategy to calculate her
best response to the receiver’s strategy.
13.3 Examples
Let us revisit my colleague example that started it all. We’ll formalize and
explain it in terms of our model.
Suppose Ann and Bob work together and they report to Carl, who is
an IT manager. Bob has trouble debugging a Java program he has written and
approaches Ann for help. Ann is an expert and wants to help her colleague.
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The surface matrix mCK (Figure 27) is common knowledge between Ann and
Bob.
Bob
Ann
H N
J 3, 1 0,−1
S 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 27: Normal form representation of the game mCK where Bob needs help
with Java code (J) or show off his expertise in Sql (S). Bob sends the message
“Java” if he needs help with Java or the message “Sql” if he wants to show off his
Sql expertise. Ann decides whether to help (H) or not help (N) Bob.
Let nature’s move be J i.e. Bob needs help with Java code. This is
Bob’s private information which Ann does not have. Bob sends the message
“Java” to Ann asking for her help. Ann wants to help her colleague and she
chooses H. Bob gets a payoff of 3 and Ann a payoff of 1.
Now imagine the following scenario. Bob needs help with his Java code
and is about to send the message “Java” to Ann asking for her help when Carl
becomes an audience in the signaling game between Bob and Ann. Let us say,
Bob knows of Carl’s presence but Ann does not. Bob sends the message “Sql”
instead of message “Java” to Ann. Why did Bob send a different message? Bob
is now playing from his transformed matrix mBob (Figure 28) which he may
have computed taking into consideration his relationship with the manager.
Perhaps he thinks if he asks for help while Carl is present, Carl would come
to know that he is weak in Java. Bob is playing his best strategy using his
transformed matrix while Ann is playing the game using the surface matrix.
Bob sends the message “Sql”. Ann chooses not to help (N). Since the actual
world and the receiver’s action determine players’ payoffs, Bob receives a payoff
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of 0 from mBob and Ann receives a payoff of -1 from mCK .
Bob
Ann
H N
J −3, 1 0,−1
S 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 28: Normal form representation of the transformed game mBob from Bob’s
perspective when Carl is an audience.
Let us say that Ann sees Carl right after Bob starts bragging about his
Sql expertise. Now Ann has her own theory of the situation. She has her own
transformed matrix due to Carl’s presence. Let mAnn (Figure 29) be Ann’s
transformed matrix in the presence of Carl. Ann gets a higher payoff from
mAnn helping Bob while Carl is watching. Perhaps Ann thinks Carl will be
impressed with her helping Bob.
Bob
Ann
H N
“Java′′ 3, 2 0,−1
“Sql′′ 0, 2 0, 0
Figure 29: Normal form representation of the transformed game mAnn from Ann’s
perspective when Carl is an audience.
Bob chooses that strategy which is “best” using his transformed matrix
mBob. In this case, the signal “Sql” would get him a payoff of -1 if Ann believes
it and chooses not to help. A payoff of -1 is better than a payoff of -3 so Bob
sends the message “Sql.” Ann chooses the strategy which is “best” using her
own transformed matrix mAnn. Ann can get a higher payoff by showing Carl
that she is helping Bob. Her payoff from helping Bob is 2 independent of Carl’s
signal. Therefore, Ann chooses to help. Since the payoffs are determined by
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the actual world and Ann’s action, Bob gets a payoff of -3 from his transformed
matrix mBob and Ann receives a payoff of 2 from her transformed matrix mAnn.
If Bob is intelligent, he can predict Ann’s behavior by imagining Ann’s
transformed matrix. Let mAnnBob be the transformed matrix as imagined by
Bob from Ann’s perspective. For simplicity, let’s say mAnnBob is the same as
Ann’s transformed matrix mAnn. Then Bob can try to guess what is Ann’s
strategy for each of his signals. Bob can ask, If I send the signal “Java”
Ann’s best response is H and the payoff from mBob is -3. If I send the signal
“Sql,” Ann’s best response is H, which would give me a payoff of -3. She will
choose H regardless of my message and I will get a payoff of -3 as my payoff
is determined by actual world and Ann’s action. So I might as well send the
signal “Java.” At least I will have my broken code fixed 22.
This example clearly shows how players may be playing the same game
using different matrices than what is common knowledge. It is possible for
Ann and Bob’s transformed matrices to be the same and if it were common
knowledge the game reduces to one where players strategize choosing their
best strategy given other’s strategy as in the original game.
Let us re-examine some examples from the literature in terms of our
model. Skyrms[134] provides an example of deception among non-human
species.
Fireflies use their light for sexual signaling. In the western hemi-
sphere, males fly over meadows, flashing a signal. If a female on
22Of course, one could also consider the case where the actual world is “Sql” and Bob
doesn’t need help but Ann is tempted to show to the manager that she is helping Carl.
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the ground gives the proper sort of answering flashes, the male
descends and they mate. The flashing “code” is species-specific.
Females and males in general use and respond to the pattern of
flashes only of their own species. There is, however, an exception.
A female firefly of the genus Photuris, when she observes a male
of the genus Photinus, may mimic the female signals of the males
species, lure him in, and eat him. She gets not only a nice meal,
but also some useful protective chemicals that she cannot get in any
other way.
F
M
I NI
G 2, 2 0, 0
NG 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 30: The surface matrix mCK is common knowledge between Photinus male
and female. The sender (F) sends a signal “Go” or “No Go” corresponding to the
worlds go (G) or no go (NG). The receiver (M) chooses to interact (I) or not interact
(NI). The dominant strategy for the male firefly is to choose I if the world is G.
Figure 30 shows the signaling game between female and male fireflies
of the genus Photinus. We’ll call this game, love to death.
F
M
I NI
“Go” 2, 2 0, 0
“No Go” 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 31: Photinus male firefly’s transformed matrix mM where rows are possible
Photinus female signals and columns are his actions.
The game matrix mCK is common knowledge between the sender and
132
FM
I NI
G 2, 2 0, 0
NG 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 32: Photinus female firefly’s transformed matrix mF where rows are worlds
and columns are actions which is identical to mCK .
F
M
I NI
“Go” 2, 2 0, 0
“No Go” 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 33: Photinus male firefly’s transformed matrix mMF as imagined by Phot-
inus female firefly.
the receiver. Signals have pre-defined meaning23 which is common knowledge
between the sender and the receiver i.e. “Go”;s {G} and “No Go”;s {NG}.
The receiver reasons24 as follows, If I receive a signal “Go” from the sender then
it is the case that the world is G. If I receive a signal “No Go” from the sender
then it is the case that the world is NG. My Best response to “Go” would be to
interact as it will give me a higher payoff. In effect, the receiver is transforming
the surface matrix into mM (Figure 31) which associates signal/action pairs
23Signals with pre-defined meaning are signs if they are also common knowledge.
24We do not intend to attribute to insects a faculty for reasoning but rather explain their
action based on our observation of their behavior.
F
M
I NI
G 2,−10 0, 0
NG 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 34: Photuris female firefly’s transformed matrix mF ′ where rows are worlds
and columns are actions.
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to payoffs. In the normal case, where the female firefly intends to mate with
the male, the sender’s transformed matrix mF (Figure 32) is identical to mCK .
Additionally, the sender imagines the receiver having a transformed matrix
mMF (Figure 33) and that the receiver has a best response for each of her
signals. The sender reasons as follows, The signal “Go” will give me a higher
payoff in mF . If I send the signal “Go,” the receiver will choose to interact
since that action is his best response in mMF to my signal “Go.” Therefore, I
will send the signal “Go”.
Now let us look at the case where the female firefly of the genus Photuris
wants to deceive the male firefly of the genus Photinus. What sets this apart
from the normal case is the fact that the sender’s transformed matrix mF ′
(Figure 34) is different from the surface matrix mCK . Here the sender receives
the same payoff of 2 but gets a meal instead of a mate.
The receiver has transformed mCK into mM where rows are signals and
columns are actions. He is using the pre-defined meaning of the signals to
guess which world he is in and act accordingly. His best strategy given mM
and the signal “Go” is to interact (I) with the female. The sender also has
her own net matrix mF ′ which is different than the surface matrix mCK that
is common knowledge. The sender also has her mental model of what matrix
the receiver is using. Let mMF , which is the same as mM , be the receiver’s
transformed matrix as imagined by the sender. The sender may guess the
possible receiver actions for each of her messages. The sender may reason
as follows, If I send the signal “Go”, the receiver will choose “I” using mMF
thinking that he will receive a payoff of 2. If the receiver chooses action I, my
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payoff from mF ′ is 2 and the receiver’s payoff is -10 but the receiver’ doesn’t
know this. I will send the signal “Go”. Photuris female receives a payoff of 2
as in the case of Photinus female and Photinus male gets eaten thus a payoff
of -10. Photinus male dies happy thinking he’s receiving a payoff of 2.
The love to death game clearly shows how the sender and the receiver
are acting based on different matrices. Photuris female is making use of lan-
guage with established meaning i.e. the meaning of signals have been estab-
lished by the females of Photinus who want to mate rather than eat Photinus
male!
Let’s look at some examples where Gricean Implicature is affected by
the presence of an audience.
Ann pays Bob a visit. Bob wants to offer Ann tea or coffee but doesn’t
know her preference. Bob asks Ann whether she likes tea or coffee. Ann signals
her preference with a signal “Tea” for tea and “Coffee” for coffee. There are
two possible worlds w1 and w2. In w1 Ann prefers tea and in w2 she prefers
coffee. Bob has a choice between two actions, a1 and a2, offering tea or coffee
to his guest. Figure 35 shows the surface matrix mCK for the game.
Ann
Bob
a1 a2
w1 1, 1 0, 0
w2 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 35: Normal form representation of the game mCK where Ann and Bob’s
preferences are aligned and Bob makes his action dependent on Ann’s Cheap Talk
message.
Here Ann and Bob’s preferences are aligned i.e. Ann likes to drink
135
Ann
Bob
a1 a2
“Tea” 1, 1 0, 0
“Coffee” 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 36: Normal form representation of the transformed game mBob from Bob’s
perspective where rows are possible sender signals and columns are actions.
coffee and Bob wants to treat his guest well. If w2 is the true state of the
world, Ann will send message “Coffee” and Bob will take action a2 using mBob
(Figure 36) and offer Ann coffee. Ann gets a payoff of 1 from mCK and Bob
gets a payoff of 1 from mBob.
Suppose Carl is present and an audience to Bob and Ann’s conversation.
Say Carl likes Ann, and just the day before, the following conversation took
place between Ann and Carl.
Carl: Would you like to go out for coffee?
Ann: I don’t like coffee.
By sending the signal “Coffee” to Bob, Ann is observing the Cooper-
ative Principle with Bob but implicature arises between Ann and Carl. Carl
may think that Ann intends for him to know that she is definitely not inter-
ested and that may be Ann’s true intention. However, if Ann cares about
Carl’s feelings, she may send the message “Tea” instead.
Let us look at the case where Ann doesn’t want to be rude to Carl or
hurt his feelings. Let mAnn (FIgure 37) be Ann’s transformed matrix in Carl’s
presence.
Let the matrix that Ann imagines from Bob’s perspective mBobAnn be
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Ann
Bob
a1 a2
w1 1, 1 0, 0
w2 0, 0 −1, 1
Figure 37: Normal form representation of the transformed game mAnn from Ann’s
perspective.
the same as mBob. Ann reasons as follows, If I send the message “Coffee,”
Bob will take action a2 using mBobAnn and my payoff from mAnn for world w2
and a2 is -1. If I send the message “Tea,” Bob will choose action a1 and my
payoff from mAnn is 0 and Bob’s payoff from mBobAnn is 1. A payoff of 0 is
better than -1. I will send the message “Tea.”
Let mAnn′ (Figure 38) be Ann’s transformed matrix in the case where
Ann intends for Carl to know that she is definitely not interested.
Ann
Bob
a1 a2
w1 1, 1 0, 0
w2 0, 0 2, 1
Figure 38: Normal form representation of the transformed game mAnn′ from Ann’s
perspective.
Here Ann gets a higher payoff by send the message “Coffee” to Bob.
She not get a cup of coffee but also gets her message a cross to Carl.
Let us modify Searle’s example that Grice [63] used to distinguish be-
tween literal and pragmatic meaning of a sentence. We’ll add an audience and
re-examine it in terms of our formal model.
An American soldier in the Second World War is captured by
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Italian troops. In order to get the Italian troops to release him
he intends to tell them in Italian or German that he is a German
soldier. He doesn’t know Italian but says the only German line
that he knows, Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen which
in German means Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees
bloom. However, the Italian troops who do not know this meaning
but can figure out the soldier is speaking in German, may reason as
follows. The soldier just spoke in German. He must intend to tell
us that he is a German soldier. Why would he speak in German
otherwise? It could very well be that he is saying I am a German
soldier.
Here, the sentence uttered by the American soldier doesn’t literally
mean but implies that the American soldier is German. As one can see, the
fact that the Italian troops do not know the literal meaning of the sentence
the American soldier uses with the intention of inducing a belief in them that
he is German is crucial to the reasoning on both parts.
The surface matrix mCK is shown in Figure 39.
S
T
R D
A 1,−1 −1, 1
G 1, 1 −1,−1
Figure 39: Normal form representation of the surface matrix mCK between the
American soldier (S) and the Italian troops (T). The rows are states of the worlds
American (A) and German (G). The columns are actions the Italian troops can take
i.e. release (R) or detain (D).
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This is an example where ;s is defined but not common knowledge.
The Italian troops can only guess what language the sentence belongs to but
not what it means. So the function ;p maps a German sounding sentence to
G and an English sentence to A. It seems natural to think that the pragmatic
semantic function is common knowledge in this case as the American soldier’s
reasoning would only work if he knew that the Italian troops are using “G”
;p {G}.
The receiver’s transformed matrix mT is shown in Figure 40.
S
T
R D
“E” 1,−1 −1, 1
“G” 1, 1 −1,−1
Figure 40: Normal form representation of the transformed matrix mT for the
Italian troops where the rows are signals and columns are actions.
The American soldier knows the Italian troops’ transformed matrix and
make use of it to get himself released. The American soldier reasons as follows,
If I send the message “G,” the Italian troops may release me but if I send the
message “E” (or any other English sentence for that matter) then the Italian
troops may detain me. I get a higher payoff from uttering the only German
sentence that I know. Let me utter that sentence.
Suppose we add an audience to the game between the American soldier
and the Italian troops. Say the audience speaks German and the Italian troops
know this but the American soldier does not. The Italian troops can find out
the literal meaning of the German sentence by asking the audience. Once the
audience informs the Italian troops of the literal meaning of the sentence, the
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Italian troops’ transformed matrix changes to mT ′ shown in Figure 41.
S
T
R D
“E” 1,−1 −1, 1
“G” 1,−1 −1, 1
Figure 41: Normal form representation of the transformed matrix mT ′ where the
rows are signals and the columns are actions.
The American soldier will utter the German sentence considering mCK
and mT . The Italian troops who now know that the solder is not German will
choose to detain him. The Italian troops receive a payoff of 1 from mT ′ and
the American soldier a payoff of -1 from mCK .
We have accounted for the results from empirical studies in our formal
model. The definition of net utilities where each player considers the benefit
or loss to other players based on their perceived relationships provides the
mechanism for addressing questions that the existing signaling models fail to
answer, such as deception. A number of empirical studies [80][69] suggest that
people have an aversion to lying. People don’t lie if the loss to the other
player is greater than their own gain and people lie less often to friends than
strangers.
Let us re-examine the job applicant example in terms of our model.
The matrix for one version of the game is shown in Figure 42.
Say Ann’s ability is low. Ann has an incentive to lie where by sending
the message “High,” she can get a payoff of 2 if Bob believes her message and
hires her for the demanding job. Let’s look at how Ann may play a different
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Ann
Bob
D U
H 2, 1 0, 0
L 2, 0 1, 2
Figure 42: Normal form representation of the game where Nature chooses Ann’s
type high (H) or low (L). Ann sends the message “High” or “Low” to Bob. And
Bob decides whether to hire Ann for the demanding (D) or undemanding job (U).
strategy based on her net utility.
Let ∆Ann,Bob be a measure of relationship between Ann and Bob as
perceived by Ann. Say ∆Ann,Bob = 100, Ann perceives her relationship to Bob
to be distant. Then Ann’s net utility from (L, D) is 2 and her net utility from
(L, U) is 2.02. As Ann’s net utilities are not affected much by her relationship
to Bob, she may lie and send the message “High” to Bob.
If on the other hand, ∆Ann,Bob = 1, Ann perceives her relationship to
Bob to be close, then her net utility from (L, D) is 2 but her net utility from
(L, U) is 3. Ann gets a higher net utility by not lying to Bob and she will send
the message “Low.” and being honest to Bob.
The game shown in Figure 43 is a modification of the game in Figure
42.
S
R
D U
H 2, 1 0, 0
L 2,−10 1, 2
Figure 43: Normal form representation of the game where Nature chooses Ann’s
type high (H) or low (L). Ann sends the message “High” or “Low” to Bob. And
Bob decides whether to hire Ann for the demanding (D) or undemanding job (U).
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As before Ann’s ability is low but she has an incentive to lie Bob. Say
∆Ann,Bob = 100, Ann perceives her relationship to Bob to be distant, then
Ann’s net utility from (L, D) is 1.9 and her net utility from (L, U) is 1.01. If
on the other hand, ∆Ann,Bob = 1, Ann perceives her relationship to Bob to be
close, then her net utility from (L, D) is -8 and her net utility from (L, U) is
3. In either case, Ann’s net utility is higher if she is honest to Bob and she
will send the message “Low.”
Let us assume Ann and Bob are distant and their net utilities are close
or the same as their surface utilities. We’ll examine how Carl’s presence may
affect Ann and Bob’s strategies. Consider the surface matrix mCK shown in
Figure 44. As before, Ann’s ability is low and she has an incentive to lie. Carl
is an audience to Ann and Bob’s conversation. Assume Carl knows Ann’s
ability.
Ann
Bob
D U
H 2, 1 0, 0
L 2, 0 1, 2
]Normal form representation of the game mCK .
If Ann knows whether Bob and Carl are close or distant, she may calcu-
late Bob’s transformed matrix. However, if she is not sure of their relationships
then she may imagine two matrices from Bob’s perspective mσ1BobAnn (Figure
45) and mσ2BobAnn (Figure 46). In m
σ1
BobAnn , Bob and Carl are close and in
mσ2BobAnn, Bob and Carl are distant.
In mσ1BobAnn, Ann imagines Bob and Carl being close. Ann’s payoff from
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Ann
Bob
D U
“High” −2, 1 0, 0
“Low” 2, 0 1, 2
Figure 45: Normal form representation of the game mσ1BobAnn where Ann thinks
Bob and Carl are friends and suspects that Carl would reveal her true ability to
Bob.
Ann
Bob
D U
“High” 2, 1 0, 0
“Low” 2, 0 1, 2
Figure 46: Normal form representation of the game mσ2BobAnn where Ann thinks
Bob and Carl are distant and suspects that Carl would not reveal her true ability
to Bob.
the signal “High” is -2 as Carl may reveal her true ability to Bob. In mσ2BobAnn,
Ann imagines Bob and Carl as being distant and her payoff is 2 as before.
This is an interesting case where Ann’s temperament may affect what signal
she sends. So while contemplating if she should send the signal “High,” if Ann
is risk averse, she would not lie to Bob as she could end up with a negative
payoff. However, if she is aggressive she may lie to Bob anyway taking the risk
of Carl revealing information about her ability to Bob.
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14 Conclusion
The computer that was originally built for computing numbers has evolved into
a device for computing with all types of information, words, numbers, graphics,
and sounds. Thus, with the commoditization of computers and invention of the
Internet, the computer has turned into a communication device, transmitting
information between people. It has become the new medium for signaling. As
information travels faster, the world seems smaller, and our understanding of
the external world and self is evolving. Our traditional notions of identity,
reality, truth, information, knowledge, and communication are changing. All
of these are important issues that need attention but addressing them all is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
We live in a digital era, where every action is recorded, transmitted,
replicated, and shapes who we are. We constantly exchange information in the
presence of an inevitable and often unnoticed audience. In this thesis, we have
discussed real world problems associated with signaling in the presence of an
audience, the limitations of current game theoretic models, and the urgency
of building better models to capture the dynamics of information exchange in
communication.
Communication is a goal-oriented activity where interlocutors use lan-
guage as a means to achieve an end while taking into account the goals and
plans of others. Game theory, being the scientific study of strategically interac-
tive decision-making, provides the mathematical tools for modeling language
use among rational decision makers. When we speak of language use, it is
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obvious that questions arise about what someone knows and what someone
believes. Such a treatment of statements as moves in a language game has
roots in the philosophy of language and in economics. In the first, the idea is
prominent with the work of Strawson, later Wittgenstein, Austin, Grice, and
Lewis. In the second, the work of Crawford, Sobel, Rabin, and Farrell.
We have argued that existing models of signaling are over-idealized
and fail to explain the dynamics of information exchange in communication.
In particular, we have argued that the two-player signaling game doesn’t apply
to the research problem we have identified, where the sender sends information
to the receiver in the presence of an audience. We have also argued that
relationships among players lie at the heart of communication and trust is
the heuristic decision rule that allows us to deal with complexities that would
require unrealistic effort if we had to rationally decide. It is the heuristic rule
that helps us converse with each other.
In this thesis, we have brought together ideas from philosophy of lan-
guage, game theory, psychology, logic, and computer science. We have ex-
tended Grice and Lewis’ ideas on cooperative communication and the ideas of
Crawford, Farrell, Rabin, Sobel, and Stalnakar on communication with par-
tially overlapping interests. We have supplemented the traditional model of
signaling games with the following innovations: We have considered the effect
of the relationships, whether close or distant, among players. We have consid-
ered the role that ethical considerations may play in communication. We have
shown that communication requires awareness of self knowledge and knowl-
edge of others. Finally, in our most significant innovation, we have introduced
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an audience in a two-player signaling game whose presence affects the sender’s
signal and/or the receiver’s response.
In our model, we no longer have assumed that the entire structure of
the game is common knowledge as some of the priorities of the players and
relationships among some of them might not be known to the other players.
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15 Appendix
15.1 Language of Knowledge
The language of Logic of Knowledge consists of a set of finitely many individ-
uals I = {1, . . . , n}. The language is that of propositional calculus augmented
by modal operators Ki, for each i ∈ I, as follows:
a) Atomic formulae P={p1, . . . , pm, . . .} is a set of variables of the
propositional calculus; they are to be interpreted as “primitive” facts.
b) Connectives C={¬,∧} ∪ {Ki : i ∈ I} is the set of connectives. The
Kis are modal operators; Kiϕ intuitively means: “agent i knows ϕ.” ϕ ∨ ψ is
equivalent to ¬(¬ϕ wedge¬ψ) according to DeMorgan’s Law. We define an
abbreviation Li(ϕ) which is equivalent to ¬Ki(¬ϕ). Li(ϕ). Li(ϕ) intuitively
means: “agent i thinks ϕ is possible.”
c) Well formed formulae WFF is the set of formulae defined as: If pj ∈
P , then pj ∈ WFF . If ϕ, ψ ∈ WFF , then ¬ϕ ∈ WFF and (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ WFF .
If ϕ ∈ WFF and i ∈ I, then Ki(aˇrphi) ∈ WFF . That is a sentence in the
language of knowledge is either an atomic formulae p or an expression of the
form ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, and Ki(ϕ) where ϕ and ψ are recursively built sentences.
The notion of knowledge we want to capture is axiomatized by the
following set of axioms (called LK5 system):
A1. All tautologies of propositional logic
A2. Kiϕ∧Ki(ϕ→ ψ)→ Kiψ
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A3. Kiϕ→ ϕ
A4. Kiϕ→KiKiϕ
A5. Liϕ→KiLiϕ
R1. ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ` ψ
R2. ϕ ` Kiϕ
A1 and R1 respectively are the axioms and the modus ponens rule of
propositional logic. A2 states that an individual’s knowledge is closed under
implication, that is, if an individual i knows a formula, then he also knows
all its logical consequences. A3 states that individuals know only things that
are true. A4 and A5 state that individuals are in introspective; if an individ-
ual knows a formula, then he knows of knowing it. There are no universal
consensus on assuming the introspection axioms A4 and A5.
The above axiomatization parallels modal logic. In fact, upon reading
Ki as the necessity operator, and Li as the possibility operator, we obtain the
axiom system S5. This is the reason why our logic of knowledge has been
called LK5. The parallel modal logic can go further, if we drop axiom scheme
A5, the resulting logic (called LK4) corresponds to S4. Finally, taking out also
axiom scheme A4, we obtain a system (called LK) that corresponds exactly
to system T .
Logical Omniscience: Axioms A2 together with R2 above raises the
so-called problem of “logical omniscience.” They force a view of individuals
as perfect reasoners: adding a theorem ξ implies that Kiξ also becomes a
theorem, and hence it is impossible to have ξ ∧ ¬Kiξ. All individuals then
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know all valid formulas and also all their logical consequences. This does not
seem to be a realistic model for dealing with everyday reasoning. Even if ξ is
valid, we may fail to know ξ.
Suppose we drop R2 from the above axiomatization, and add the axiom
of logical omniscience:
A6. If ` ξ then ` Kiξ
If φ ` ξ then Kiφ ` Kiξ
And also add the axiom scheme:
A7. If ψ is an axiom according to A1-A6, then so is Kiψ for each i.
Then in the new system all the old theorems are preserved, but now
ξ ∧ ¬Kiξ is consistent. This is so because the new system still preserves the
necessitation rule, but it states that necessitation is reasonable only for those
formulae ϕ’s which are logically true, or at least true on the whole model.
15.2 Models of Knowledge
We need a semantics in order interpret sentences about knowledge. A se-
mantics consists of an idealized model of the world and an account of when
a sentence in the logic is true in the model. Two commonly used models of
knowledge are Information and Kripke Structures; the former uses partitions
and the later accessibility relations to model knowledge.
Information Structures: An information structure of N players is a pair
(W, (Pi)) where W is the set of states and Pi is a function that assigns to each
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state w a non-empty subset of states Pi(w) for each player i where i ∈ N . At
state w, player i considers the states in Pi(w) possible and excludes the states
outside Pi(w). We can impose some conditions on information structure:
1. w ∈ Pi(w) (Players considers the true state possible)
2. If w′ ∈ Pi(w) then Pi(w′) ⊆ Pi(w)
3. If w′ ∈ Pi(w) then Pi(w′) ⊇ Pi(w)
These three conditions together are equivalent to saying that the infor-
mation structure is partitional.
Let (W, (Pi)) be an information structure. We say that the event E ⊆
W is known at state w by player i if Pi(w) ⊆ E. The statement “player i
knows E” is then identified with all the states in which E is known: Ki(E) =
{w : Pi(w) ⊆ E}. Using this definition and the assumption given above, we
can derive the following properties about a player’s knowledge:
I1. Ki(E) ⊆ E (using 1)
I2. Ki(E) ⊆ Ki(Ki(E)) (using 2)
I3. ¬Ki(E) ⊆ Ki(¬Ki(E)) (using 3)
Kripke Structures: We can interpret above logical system using models
with possible worlds which intuitively says that besides the current state of
affairs, there are other possible states of affairs (i.e. other possible worlds) for
individual i; individuals may be unable to distinguish the true world among all
possible worlds. An individual is said to know a formula ψ if ψ is true in all the
worlds possible for him. Nested modal operators are allowed and intuitively
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KiKj . . . (ϕ) means “agent i knows that agent j knows that . . . that ϕ is true.”
In order to give a semantics to the logic of knowledge, we need a formal way of
representing worlds and possibility relations (one for each individual) defined
between them; Kripke structures are a good formal tool.
A Kripke structure M , over a set of atomic propositions P , is a (n+2)
tuple 〈W,pi,R1, . . . , Rn〉 where:
• W is a set of states (also called possible worlds);
• pi : W → 2P is the interpretation function which assigns a truth value to
every atomic proposition at every state w ∈ W ; pi(w, pi) ∈ {1,−1} for
each state w ∈ W and atomic proposition pi ∈ P .
• Ri ⊆ W ×W is a binary relation (known as accessibility relation) for
agent i ∈ I. Ri is read “v is accessible from w for agent i” or “v is
i − accessible from w.” (w, v) ∈ Ri holds if and only if agent i cannot
distinguish the state of affairs w from the state of affairs v. In other
words, if w is the actual state of the world, then agent i would consider
v as a possible state of the world.
(M,w) |= ϕ denotes the notion that the formula ϕ is satisfied by the Kripke
structure M = 〈W, (Ri), pi〉 at state w. If ϕ is atomic, (M,w) |= ϕ iff pi assigns
true to ϕ at state w. For the test of the formulas, the satisfaction relation |=
is defined inductively as follows:
- (M,w) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,w) 6|= ϕ
- (M,w) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M,w) |= ϕ and (M,w) |= ψ
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- (M,w) |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff (M,w) |= ϕ or (M,w) |= ψ
- (M,w) |= ϕ→ ψ iff (M,w) 6|= ϕ or (M,w) |= ψ
- (M,w) |= Ki(ϕ) iff for all v ∈ W such that wRiv, we have (M,w) |= ϕ
We could also derive additional properties about knowledge in Kripke
structures by imposing some constraints on agent i’s accessibility relation Ri.
Letting Ri be an equivalence relation ensures that everything known by i is
true, and that i knows his own internal knowledge, If Ri is reflexive, transitive,
and symmetric (an equivalence relation) we obtain the following for all w ∈ W
and for every formula ϕ for agent i:
K1. (M,w) |= Ki(ϕ)→ ϕ
K2. (M,w) |= Ki(ϕ)→ Ki(Ki(ϕ)))
K3. (M,w) |= ¬Ki(ϕ)→ Ki(¬Ki(ϕ)))
These three properties K1-K3 in Kripke structures correspond to I1-I3
in information structures respectively. Kripke structures can be represented
by labelled graphs, whose nodes are the states in W , and two nodes w and v
are connected by an edge labelled i iff (w, v) ∈ Ri.
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16 Appendix B
Beliefs are the products of reasoning and beliefs guide actions. Actions are
expected to reach goals if beliefs that guide them are true. Both induction
and deduction supply reason to believe each seeks to preserve the truth of its
premises while extending them to new truths acquired as beliefs.
16.1 Rational Thought
What is reasoning? Reasoning is the set of processes that enables human
beings to go beyond the information given, make sense of things, establish or
verify facts, and form beliefs. It is a way by which thinking comes from one
idea to a related idea. Adler [6] explains reasoning as a transition in thought,
where some beliefs or thoughts provide the ground or reason for coming to
another.
From her beliefs that
(1) Either Bob is a tea drinker or a coffee drinker.
and
(2) Bob does not drink tea.
Ann infers that
(3) Bob drinks coffee.
Reasoning in an argument is valid if the argument’s conclusion must
be true when the premises (reasons given in support of the conclusion) are
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true. So assuming Ann bases her inference on the deductive relationship (1)
and (2) to (3), her argument is valid since (1) and (2) imply (3). And (3) is a
logical consequence of (1) and (2). In reaching (3) Ann comes to a new belief
even though its information is entailed by (1) and (2). This is called deductive
reasoning.
Unlike a deductive argument, an inductive argument provides for new
beliefs whose information is not entailed by the beliefs from which it is inferred.
(4) Ann brought her book to the class every day of the semester.
So probably
(5) Ann will bring it to the next class.
Inductive reasoning is based on previous observations and the premises
only render the truth of the conclusion more probable than in their absence.
In inductive reasoning the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth
of the conclusion. So regardless of the above example being a good inductive
argument, premise (4) can be true and conclusion (5) false. Therefore, the
argument is invalid.
How does reasoning develop? According to Piaget, the twentieth cen-
tury Swiss psychologist, development of human reasoning occurs in stages.
There are four stages identified with Piaget’s theory of cognitive development
of reasoning [10].
The first stage occurs between birth to two years of age and is called the
Sensori-motor. In this stage, children learn to differentiate self from objects.
They start to recognize self as an agent of action and begin to act intentionally
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e.g. pulling an object and shaking a rattle to make noise. They realize that
things continue to exist even when no longer present to the sense.
The second stage occurs between the ages of two to seven years and
is called Pre-operational. In this stage, they start to use language and to
represent objects by images and words. Thinking is still egocentric so they
have difficulty taking the viewpoint of others. They start to classify objects
by a single feature. For example, grouping together all the red blocks regardless
of shape or all the square blocks regardless of color.
The third stage occurs between the age of seven to eleven years and is
called Concrete-operational. They start to think logically about objects and
events. They can classify objects according to several features and can order
them in series along a single dimension such as size.
The fourth and final stage occurs after eleven years of age and is called
Formal-operational. In this stage, individuals can think logically about ab-
stract propositions and can systematically test hypotheses. They become con-
cerned with the hypothetical, the future, and ideological problems.
16.2 Theories of Reasoning
Psychologists have attempted to study and explain how people reason. Which
cognitive processes are engaged in reasoning? How do cultural factors affect
the inferences people draw? Can reasoning be modeled computationally? Can
animals reason the way human beings do? Researchers have been determined
to find which particular formal logic is laid down in the mind and which
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rules of inference are used in its mental formulation. In parallel, computer
scientists have developed programs that prove arguments based on formal rules
of inference. As a result, the research on reasoning has accumulated numerous
experimental results and models of human reasoning process.
A majority of these theories fall under logic-based, mental models, and
heuristic approaches. Logic-based approaches to deduction have been criti-
cized for being too narrowly focused on classical logic. Probabilistic approaches
and mental model theory both provide an alternative to logic-based models.
However, they too have their shortcomings.
At the heart of psychological studies on human deductive reasoning lie
the topics of selection, suppression, and syllogism.
Selection was originally devised by Wason [153] and has ever since be-
come one of the well studied puzzles in the psychology of reasoning. In Wason’s
selection task, subjects are presented with a rule and they have to select cases
in order to make judgments either about compliance of the cases or about the
truth of the rule.
There are different flavors of the selection task and one version is show
in Figure 47. In this version, subjects are shown a set of four cards. Each card
has a number on one side and a letter on the other side.
The visible faces of the cards show A, B, 2, and 3; subjects are asked
which card(s) should be turned over in order to test the truth of the claim
that
(6) if a card has an A on one side then it has a 2 on the other side.
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Figure 47: Wason’s Selection Task.
Wason discovered that individuals unfamiliar with logic almost always
selected the wrong card. For anyone with some formal training in logic, the
correct response should be obvious. If you turn over the card showing A and
find a number other than 2, then the claim is false. Similarly, if you turn over
the card showing 3 and find an A on its other side, the claim is also false.
Hence, one needs to select the card showing A or 3. However, subjects rarely
select the card showing 3 and often choose the card showing A and maybe 2.
If you select the 2 card, then nothing on its other side can show that (6) is
false.
The next topic that has been of interest to psychological experiments of
reasoning has been suppression of modus ponens inferences. It has been argued
that background knowledge leads to suppression [22]. Subjects presented with
a condition like
(7) If Ann has an essay to write then she studies late in the library.
and the premise
(8) Ann has an essay to write.
make the inference that
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(9) Ann studies late in the library.
However, this inference is suppressed when there is an additional con-
ditional such as
(10) If the library stays open then Ann studies late in the library.
The other prominent topic that has got quite a bit of attention on
psychological studies of reasoning is Syllogism. Syllogistic inference is a form
of reasoning with quantifiers where the conclusion is inferred from two or more
premises.
For example,
(11) All men are mortal.
(12) Bob is a man.
Therefore,
(13) Bob is mortal.
The syllogistic language is confined to four sentence types.
1. All A are B (universal affirmative)
2. Some A are B (particular affirmative)
3. No A are B (universal negative)
4. Some A are not B (particular negative)
In a majority of experiments on syllogistic reasoning, subjects are given
two premises and asked either to choose from a list of possible conclusions or
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say if any conclusions followed from the premises. Researchers have also used
evaluation tasks, asking subjects to decide whether a given argument is valid
or not.
Newstead [88][89] was among the first to study subjects’ interpretations
of syllogistic inferences, making a connection to Gricean theory of Implicatures.
His results show that subjects often make inferences that does not logically
follow from the premises. For example, when subjects were told to assume,
All A are B, and then asked wither it followed that All B are A must be true,
false, or could be either. A majority of subjects did not approximate a classical
interpretation of the quantifiers. In similar studies, subjects concluded, Some
A are not B from the premise Some A are B.
This kind of Gricean interpretation is also observed in experiments
where subjects were given the premises
(16) Some A are B.
(17) Some B are C.
who concluded that
(18) Some A are C.
The above argument is similar to saying, some cats are black and some
black things are dogs, therefore some cats are dogs.
In almost all the empirical studies subjects depart from the answer that
the experimenter had derived when translating the argument into a logical sys-
tem and assessing its correctness within the system. This has raised concerns
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over the method and whether human beings use logical models or something
else when making deductive inferences. This question has been at the center
stage for evolutionary psychologists.
Rips[121] argues that changing the deductive rules of a logical system
can alter arguments that are deductively correct and psychologists have over-
looked this variety assuming a single standard for deductive correctness.
A proof as a finite sequence of sentences (s1, s2, . . . , sk) in which each
sentence is either a premise, an axiom of the logical system, or a sentence
that follows from preceding sentences based on specified rules. An argument
is deducible in the system if there is a proof whose final sentence, sk, is the
conclusion of the argument.
Consider a system that includes modus ponens among its rules.
(19) If Bob deposits $1.50 cents then Bob will get a coke.
(20) Bob deposits $1.50.
(21) Bob will get a coke.
Based on modus ponens rule, (21) is true if the premises (19) and
(20) hold and the above argument is deducible in the system. However, Rips
claims that blindly applying rules to a problem will not lead to a proof in an
acceptable amount of time as some rules can produce infinite sets of irrelevant
sentences. Therefore heuristics are important to consider.
Rips presents a theory of sentential reasoning and provides an imple-
mentation called PSYCOP (short for Psychology of Proof).
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In his theory, Rips merges ideas from logic and computer science. From
logic he borrows the idea of suppositions i.e. reasoning involves suppositions or
assumptions and people tend to entertain a proposition temporarily in order to
trace its consequences. From computer science he adopts the concept of sub-
goals. People are able to adopt on a temporary basis the desire to prove some
proposition in order to achieve a further conclusion. In his view, suppositions
are roughly like provisional beliefs, and subgoals are roughly like provisional
desires. According to Rips, beliefs and desires about external states guide
external actions while provisional beliefs and provisional desires guide internal
actions in reasoning.
His basic inference system consists of a set of deduction rules that
construct a proof in the systems working memory. Upon presenting the system
with a group of premises, it will use the given rules to generate proofs of
possible conclusions. The system first stores the input premises in working
memory. It then applies the rules on memory contents in order to determine
whether any inference is possible. If so, the newly deduced sentence is added to
memory. It then scans the updated configuration, makes further deductions,
and so on until a proof has been found or no further rules remain.
The implementation PSYCOP is developed using Prolog program for
personal computers. The program model has a standard memory architecture
that is divided into long term and working memory with later having smaller
capacity. While evaluating an argument, the program begins by applying its
forward rules to the premises until no new inferences are forthcoming. It
then considers the conclusion of the argument, checking to see whether the
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conclusion is already among the assertions. If so the proof is complete, if not,
it will treat the conclusion as a goal and attempt to apply the backward rules.
Johnson-Laird [86] argues that empirical studies analyzing everyday
arguments have proven that it is extremely difficult to translate arguments
into formal logic. Unlike logic, the interpretation of sentences in daily life is
often modulated by knowledge.
For example,
(22) If Bob is in Rio de Janeiro then he is in Brazil.
and
(23) Bob is not in Brazil.
then
(24) Bob is not in Rio de Janeiro.
Based on their background knowledge that Rio de Janeiro is in Brazil,
subjects inferred (24).
Therefore, a good theory of reasoning must allow for such effects. He
argues that the system for interpreting sentences cannot work in truth func-
tional way and must take meaning and knowledge into account.
An alternative to pure logic based and heuristic approaches is the theory
of mental models or model theory. The model theory was originally developed
by Johnson-Laird and Byrne [75747574] and is built on the assumption that
reasoning is about possibilities. Human beings have difficulty thinking about
more than one possibility at a time. Working memory, which holds models in
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mind, is limited in its capacity. Therefore, reasoning that is based on models
of possibilities, where each mental model represents what is common to a
possibility, seems reasonable.
For example, when Ann says
(25) My house is in the middle of the street.
Figure 48: An diagram compatible with statement (25).
We construct a mental model of a single possibility even though the
proposition expressed by (25) could be true in many ways. Thus (25) maps to
a scene (Figure 48) where Ann’s house is roughly in the middle of the street
rather than toward one end or the other.
It is well established that humans beings cannot hold an infinitude of
possibilities while working out an argument. Mental models lighten the load
on working memory by representing less information. The mental model of
(25) captures what is common to different possibilities keeping in mind that
human beings tend to think about possibilities one model at a time.
He argues that semantic and pragmatic modulation affect the interpre-
tation of sentences so they cannot be treated as strictly truth functional.
For example, consider the following premises
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(26) The cup is to the right of the saucer.
(27) The spoon is to the left of the saucer.
A diagram of the possibility compatible with premises (26) and (27) is
shown in Figure 49.
Figure 49: A diagram compatible with statements (26) and (27).
The diagram shows that the cup is to the right of the spoon, and this
conclusion follows from the premises but it is not asserted in them. In this
case, the the diagram has a spatial interpretation i.e. the position of objects
in the diagram corresponds to the scene.
An interesting question that arises is, how does the principle of truth fit
in this theory? Johnson-Laird suggests that the right way to think about the
principle of truth is to think of mental models representing only those states
of affairs that are possible given an assertion. Mental models represent clauses
in the premises only when they are true in all possibilities. Additionally, if
individuals retain mental footnotes about what is false then they can flush
out mental models into fully explicit models representing both what is true
and what is false. The model theory does not abandon logic entirely but
relates to logic in the sense that an inference is valid if there are no counter
examples to its conclusion. A disadvantage of this model is over-simplification
of possibilities. This relates to Schelling’s [129] concept of focal points which
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is a way to narrow down possible solutions in a coordination problem.
So what is the nature of mental representations underlying deduction;
is it rules or is it models?
Stenning and Lambalgen [6] argue that the search for a human reason-
ing mechanism through the tasks of selection, suppression, and syllogism has
employed a narrow hypothesis testing methodology. It has ignored the support
available from modern logical semantic and pragmatic methods and instead
targeted its criticism on an inappropriate classical logic. Rejecting logic has
led to attempts to re-invent it producing some hard to interpret systems. They
argue that Psychologists have focused their research in the wrong direction;
great emphasis has been given on studying representation but the field has
pretty much ignored interpretation.
They argue that the mental processes evoked in these experiments are
interpretative processes; the processes of reasoning to interpretation.
Most of the experiments carried out by psychologists force interpre-
tation in a vacuum. Wason’s selection task is an interesting example where
recent experiments on subjects reveal that the underlying problem is due to re-
moving the normal cues on which the choice of interpretation depends. People
find Wason’s selection task much easier if it is placed in a social context.
Consider a different version of the selection task (shown in Figure 50).
You are at a bar and your job is to ensure that people obey the rule
(29) If a person is drinking beer then (s)he must be at least 18 years
old.
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Figure 50: A different version of Wason’s Selection Task.
In this version (Figure 50), subjects are shown a set of four cards. Each
card has the person’s age on one side and what they are drinking on the other
side. The visible faces of the cards show Drinking Beer, Drinking Coke, 22
Years Old, and 16 Years Old. Subjects are asked which card(s) should be
turned over in order to test the truth of (29). That is, which card(s) should be
turned over in order to determine whether or not they are breaking the rule?
The results show that subjects tend to select the correct cards i.e. the
cards showing Drinking Beer and 16 years old.
To take interpretation seriously one must take individual differences
seriously. Subjects do different things in experiments and this point has been
overlooked. Human reasoners take their knowledge into account and often go
beyond the information given (i.e. step into inductive reasoning). Stenning
and Lambalgen believe the only way out of the confusion is to take interpre-
tation seriously and separate semantics from representational issues.
Geurts [61] focuses his studies on syllogism and argues that despite
decades of psychological research on syllogistic reasoning and numerous ex-
perimental results, the empirical base has been narrow. He argues that any
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psychological account of syllogistic reasoning needs to follow from an adequate
theory of interpretation.
Theories about syllogistic reasoning proposed over the years run into
problems with certain extensions of the syllogistic language. Geurts claims
that current approaches to syllogistic reasoning are based on representational
models which encode quantified statements in terms of individuals. These
representations are limited in dealing with statements e.g., Most A are B, At
least three A are B, etc. Scientists in the field have not done any studies on
cardinal quantifiers (e.g. five, at least six, at most seven, etc), the role of
negation in syllogistic reasoning, arguments with multiple quantifiers, and so
on.
For example,
(30) At least half of the foresters are vegetarians.
This states that the set of foresters who are vegetarians is not smaller
than the set of foresters who aren’t. And since first order predicate logic allows
us to talk about individuals, it is not expressive enough for representing a
sentence like (30).
A system of inference that deals with quantifiers in terms of arbitrary
individuals cannot handle arguments such as,
(31) All vegetarians are teetotallers.
(32) Most foresters are vegetarians.
Therefore,
167
(33) Most foresters are teetotallers.
Even if a quantifier is expressible in predicate logic, the representations
involved may not be suited for psychological purposes.
For example,
(34) At least two foresters are teetotallers.
can be expressed in predicate logic as,
(35) ∃x ∃y [x6=y & forester(x) & teetotaller(x) & forester(y) & teeto-
taller(y)]
This is a rather cumbersome representation. Since predicate logic
doesn’t offer the means for talking about sets, it requires the introduction
of two individual variables and specification that their values are distinct and
that both variables stand for a forester as well as a teetotaller.
Geurts claims that the current models of syllogistic reasoning are all ad-
hoc from the point of view of language understanding. They are incapable of
capturing non-standard quantifiers because in predicate logic one cannot talk
and reason about sets. Therefore, it is impossible to represent proportional
quantified, such as most and at least half of, etc. Solving a syllogistic argument
calls for an interpretation of quantified sentences.
Mental model theory developed by Johnson-Laird et al., runs into the
same problems as logic-based theories because again quantified propositions
are represented in terms of individuals.
For example,
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(36) Two A are B.
How can we represent (36) in a mental model?
Since predicate logic and mental-model theory are both individual-
based systems, they get into the same trouble with non-standard quantifiers.
First, All A are B is not synonymous with Two A are B. Second, if it takes
two individuals to represent two, then it takes sixty individuals to represent
sixty, which gets us back to the same problem discussed in connection with
predicate-logical representations of cardinalities. Guerts believes that despite
going through many revisions, the mental model theory is still not expressive
in terms of reasoning with quantified sentences.
A different way of dealing with quantification is Charter and Oaks-
ford’s [24] probabilistic semantics which underlies their probability heuristics
model of syllogistic reasoning. According to Charter and Oaksford, humans
are geared towards reasoning with uncertainty. They are designed by evo-
lution to reason not logically but probabilistically. This account calls for a
probabilistic interpretation of quantified expressions.
For example,
(37) All A are B.
This probabilistically speaking means, that P(B|A) = 1 i.e., the condi-
tional probability of B given A equals 1.
Similarly,
(38) No A are B.
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Conveys that P(B|A) = 0, and
(39) Some A are B.
Conveys that P(B|A) > 0.
If the conditional probability of the conclusion is 1, a proposition with all
can be inferred. The probabilistic approach can afford a representation of
proportional quantifiers, such as most. According to Charter and Oaksford’s
denition,
(40) Most A are B.
means that P(B|A) is high but less than 1.
In this respect, a probabilistic semantics is more expressive than other ap-
proaches but still not expressive enough. In general, propositions involving
cardinal quantifiers cannot be translated into a probabilistic format.
For example, if it is given that
(41) Two A are B.
We do not know what P(B|A) is unless it is also known how many A’s there
are. One proposal is that (41) should mean that P (B|A)= 2/|A| (where |A|
stands for the cardinality of the set of As). Thus, if there are five vegetarians
altogether,
(42) Two vegetarians are liberals.
means that there is a 0.4 probability that a given vegetarian is a liberal. This
proposal runs into problems, the most obvious one being that it suffices for
(42) to be true that there are two liberal vegetarians; the total number of
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vegetarians is irrelevant.
In short, the probabilistic account leads to the claim that all quantifiers
are proportional, which is unintuitive for quantifiers like some, and false for
others like the cardinals. It is not just logic-based approaches that suffer from
these problems but all theories of reasoning run into the same issue.
Geurt believes logic-based approaches to deduction are more powerful
than others; limitations being quantifiers, such as most and at least half of are
not expressible in standard predicate logic. He feels the right way to deal with
representational shortcomings in logic-based models is to consider an approach
based on sets rather than individuals. He presents a logic-based model of
syllogistic reasoning motivated by semantical considerations and dropping the
assumption that syllogistic reasoning is always in terms of individuals.
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